

LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL UPDATE OUTLINE

CASES ON ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND OTHER TOPICAL AREAS OF INTEREST TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS; PLUS A CHRONOLOGY OF INDEPENDENT GROUNDS RULINGS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: These materials were compiled by John Wasberg, formerly a Senior Counsel in the Washington Attorney General’s Office, retired. The materials are provided as a research source only, are not intended as legal advice, and should not be relied on without independent research and legal analysis. Any views expressed are those of Mr. Wasberg alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any other person or any agency. The outline is updated annually. Several 2020 and 2021 decisions have been added since the July 1, 2020 version. No other edits of significance have been made. **Decisions since January 2019 are highlighted.**

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE: Note the disclaimers on the first page of the Table of Contents, including the disclaimer that any views expressed in these materials are those of the author, John Wasberg, alone. Entries regarding relatively recent appellate court decisions are generally in bold print. **Entries from decisions since January 2019 are highlighted.** The author did not find indisputable inconsistencies in these materials with police reform legislation adopted by the Washington State Legislature in 2021 and 2022, but readers are cautioned that they need to be aware of and apply that legislation to the extent that it conflicts with court decisions or statements made in these materials.

I. STOP AND FRISK, AND ARREST

A. The Seizure Continuum: “Contact” v. “Terry Seizure” v. “Arrest”

1. *When does a “contact” become a “seizure”?*

Under article I, section 7 of Washington constitution, seizure occurs when, in light of the law enforcement words or actions directed at the person, a reasonable innocent person would not feel that he or she is free to either (1) decline to talk to the officer or (2) leave. State v. Thorn, 129 Wn.2d 347 (1996) Aug. '96 LED:13

“Implicit bias” impacts analysis of “seizure” of a person by law enforcement: In a unanimous independent grounds ruling under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, the Washington Supreme Court departed from the Fourth Amendment’s approach to objective standards in ruling that the possibility of “implicit bias” must be part of the totality-of-the-circumstances “objective” test for determining if a person who is BIPOC (black, indigenous, or otherwise a person of color) has been “seized” by law enforcement – this new test asks if the contacted person is BIPOC, and, if so, asks if “an objective observer could conclude that due to law enforcement’s display of authority or use of physical force,” a reasonable BIPOC person was not free (1) to leave or (2) to refuse a request or (3) to otherwise terminate a police encounter. State v. Sum, ___ Wn.2d ___, 2022 WL ___ (June 9, 2022)

Police contact with drug suspect was lawful social contact, and officer's request to take his hands from his pockets did not make contact a seizure. State v. Fortun-Cebada, 158 Wn. App. 158 (Div. I, October 25, 2010) January '11 LED:15

State v. Guevara, 172 Wn. App. 184 (Div. III, Dec. 6, 2012) Feb. '13 LED:09 (Seizure, not mere social contact, occurred where officer's accusation of criminal activity was followed by his request that teens voluntarily empty their pockets)

State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wn. App. 20 (Div. II, 1992), March '93 LED:09 (Request for ID + questions about drugs + request for consent to search = seizure)

State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656 (2009) Feb. '10 LED:17 (Field, or "social," contact held to have developed into a "seizure" without reasonable suspicion at the point during the contact when the officer, with a nearby officer standing by, requested consent to frisk)

State v. Young, 167 Wn. App. 922 (Div. II, 2012) July '12 LED:12 (Unjustified "seizure" found in follow-up, late-night contact where, in follow-up contact, two officers essentially cornered woman behind Laundromat and asked her for identifying information)

State v. Elwood, 52 Wn. App. 70 (Div. I, 1988) Nov. '88 LED:05 (Telling FIR contact to "wait right here" – or taking ID and walking away – while checking for warrants is seizure)

State v. Hansen, 99 Wn. App. 575 (Div. I, 2000) June '00 LED:17 (Requesting ID, handing it to fellow officer who recorded information and handed it back to citizen within 30 seconds, radioing information, and then conversing with citizen in non-coercive manner, was not seizure under totality of the facts)

State v. Crane, 105 Wn. App. 301 (Div. II, 2001) June '01 LED:08 (Requesting ID and holding it for several minutes, while standing with subject, and checking by hand-held radio for outstanding warrants was seizure under totality of facts, and the seizure was not justified by the mere fact that the person had been observed approaching a residence for which police were in the process of obtaining a search warrant)

State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564 (2003) April '03 LED:03 (Washington Supreme Court holds that no seizure occurred where officer spotlighted a car parked in a market parking lot, then followed up by asking the person in the driver's seat about his presence there and by asking him for ID)

State v. Gantt, 163 Wn. App. 133 (Div. III, 2011) Nov. '11 LED:10 (Turning on overhead flashers and asking person near to vehicle and apparently associated with the vehicle to explain his presence was a seizure)

State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498 (1998) Aug. '98 LED:02 (Shining spotlight on person was not a seizure)

Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) Feb. '10 LED:05 (In Civil Rights Act lawsuit, 3-judge panel holds “seizure” occurred when social services caseworker and officer interviewed possible child sex abuse victims at elementary school without parental consent or court order or exigent circumstances). In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside this Ninth Circuit ruling, determining that the issue was moot in this case. 131 S. Ct. 2010 (2011) Aug. '11 LED:12

2. *May a Terry stop detainee be arrested for violating “obstructing” statute for merely refusing to identify himself or herself?*

No. Compare State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92 (1982) April '82 LED:02 with Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dt. Of Nevada, 124 S.Ct. 2451 (2004) Aug. '04 LED:02 (Arrest under a Nevada “stop and identify” statute that is worded differently than Washington’s “obstructing” statute). But note that fleeing from a lawful Terry stop is “obstructing.” See State v. Hudson, 56 Wn. App. 490 (1990); United States v. Williams, 837 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir., Sept. 20, 2016)

3. *Is a show of authority when attempting a stop a seizure?*

Yes, under the Washington constitution. Compare the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in (A) California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (No seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment if a suspect flees from a law enforcement show of authority that objectively seeks to detain the suspect), and (B) Torres v. Madrid, 141 S.Ct. 989 (March 25, 2021) (Seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment where an officer shot a fleeing suspect, even though she continued to flee after being shot, but there would have been no Fourth Amendment seizure if the officer’s shot had missed the suspect) with the Washington Supreme Court decision in State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498 (1998), where the Washington Court ruled that the Washington constitution, article I, section 7, deems a show of authority objectively reflecting an effort to stop or detain a suspect as a seizure even if there is no compliance by the suspect.

4. *May passengers routinely be asked for ID at MV stops?*

No, not under the Washington constitution, article I, section 7. See State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638 (1980) Aug. '80 LED:01 (Directing passenger in illegally parked car to show ID was unlawful seizure); State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689 (2004) Aug. '04 LED:07 (Washington Supreme Court majority opinion under article I, section 7 of Washington constitution interprets State v. Larson broadly, rejecting the argument that it is ok for officers to routinely request, so long as they do not demand, ID from non-violator, non-suspect passengers during traffic stops); In re Brown, 154 Wn.2d 787 (2005) Sept. '05 LED:17 (Washington Supreme Court holds that Rankin rule applies to requests to passengers for identifying information as well as to requests for ID documents); State v. Mote, 129 Wn. App. 276 (Div. I, 2005) Nov. '05 LED:10 (Court of Appeals holds Rankin rule does not extend to non-seizure contacts with occupants in parked vehicles)

State v. Allen, 138 Wn. App. 463 (Div. II, 2007) July '07 LED:21 (Rankin rule does not permit asking passenger for ID where officer knows driver is protected by a no-contact

order, but officer has no physical description and does not even know the gender of the prohibited person on the no-contact order, and the officer knows only the gender-neutral name of the prohibited person). **But see State v. Pettit, 170 Wn. App. 716 (Div. II, 2011) May '11 LED:12 (Officer held to have obtained sufficient descriptive information regarding the parties identified in a no-contact order to investigate whether driver was violating a no-contact order protecting a 16-year-old female)**

5. Does “community caretaking function” give officers authority to make “stops” for non-investigative purposes in order to help citizens?

Yes, but stop must be objectively and subjectively justified and not pretextual (similarly, certain non-investigative actions that might otherwise be deemed unlawful “searches” may be similarly justified). State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373 (2000) Sept. '00 LED:07 (Washington Supreme Court holds that this function did not justify an officer’s seizure of a young-looking teenage girl out at 10 p.m. on a school night with older, drug-historied companions, in downtown Seattle)

State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738 (2003) May '03 LED:04 (In an 8-1 decision, Washington Supreme Court distinguishes Kinzy and holds that it was ok for officers to detain a 12-year-old long enough to call his mother where the officers had responded at 12:40 a.m. to a report that youths were fighting – which, on police contact, they credibly denied – and the youths were located in an “isolated” commercial area with no nearby residences or open businesses)

6. May consent to search be sought routinely during or after MV stop for a civil infraction or minor offense or is this additional intrusion an impermissible extension of the seizure?

Generally no, though a “clean break” might make request lawful. State v. Cantrell, 70 Wn. App. 340 (Div. II, 1993) Oct. '93 LED:21 (After speeding ticket signed by violator, it was unlawful seizure for officer to extend the duration and scope of the stop by asking for consent to search MV). For additional discussion of Washington and federal case law on possible constitutional restrictions on expanding the duration and scope of traffic and investigatory stops, see the LED discussion of Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005) March '05 LED:03, April '05 LED:02 (United States Supreme Court rules that using dog outside stopped car did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).

7. Is there a strict time limit on the duration of a Terry stop?

No. While a rule of thumb of a maximum of 20 minutes is suggested as a guideline by some, duration may be shorter or longer depending on what is reasonable as officers work diligently to investigate suspicious circumstances. Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. January 19, 2011) March '11 LED:11; U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).

8. *May officers who do not have reasonable suspicion as to a drug violation bring a drug-sniffing dog to sniff the exterior of a vehicle if the use of the dog does not extend the duration of the traffic stop?*

“Maybe” is the best answer we have for Washington officers. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005) March '05 LED:03, April '05 LED:02 (United States Supreme Court ruled that using dog to sniff for drugs outside a car stopped for a traffic violation did not violate the Fourth Amendment, which limits the duration of a stop but not the scope of the investigation; the U.S. Supreme Court was focused on “seizure” issue but also addressed the “search/privacy” issue; a different ruling might be made under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, either on seizure (scope-of-seizure limits) or search (K-9 sniffing as possible search of car and/or its occupants) rationale, but there are as yet no Washington appellate court decisions directly on point) **In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (April 21, 2015) May '15 LED:02, the U.S. Supreme Court said that it meant what it said about duration limits in Caballes; a traffic stop must be limited to time reasonably needed to process the traffic matter, including running records checks, unless there is reasonable suspicion of an additional violation of law; extending duration of a stop to run a K-9 sniff for drugs is not ok if officers have no reasonable suspicion re drugs.**

9. *Does the Washington constitution permit roadblocks?*

Generally no, unless conducted under narrow, suspicion-based circumstances. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454 (1988) July '88 LED:14 (City of Seattle’s DUI roadblock program held to violate article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution); State v. Silvernail, 25 Wn. App. 185 (Div. I, 1980) April '80 LED:04 (Stopping and inquiring of the occupants of every car coming off the ferry from Vashon to West Seattle held supported under the special circumstances of that case – i.e., report from victims of just-committed robbery that gave police reasonable suspicion that robbers had taken that particular ferry to the mainland)

10. *Does Terry standard of reasonable suspicion justify a stop for a traffic infraction or is probable cause required?*

Reasonable suspicion will justify a traffic stop for a traffic infraction. See State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177 (2012) May '12 LED:25.

11. *Does Terry stop-and-frisk authority extend to non-traffic civil infractions?*

No (but, of course, safety first regarding frisk authority). State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166 (2002) June '02 LED:19 (Washington Supreme Court says “no” as it holds in an “open container” case that officer must have probable cause to believe that the infraction is occurring in his or her presence before making a seizure or frisk). State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889 (2007) Dec. '07 LED:18 (Washington Supreme Court also says that there is no Terry authority in a parking infraction case). Regardless of Duncan and Day, however,

officers obviously will and must take reasonable safety precautions, including frisking non-traffic civil infraction suspects reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous.

Note, however, that Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals held that by boarding a public bus and accepting transportation, defendant consented to the conditions of ridership, which include complying with a fare enforcement officer's request for proof of payment. State v. Meredith, ___ Wn. App. 2d ___, 492 P.3d 198 (Div. I, July 26, 2021) – July 21:12 Status: The Washington Supreme Court granted discretionary review in this case. The Court heard oral argument on February 17, 2022, and a decision is pending.

12. Does Terry authority apply to all previously committed (i.e., not committed “in the presence”) misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors?

Not as to some non-dangerous misdemeanors in circumstances where there is a reasonable alternative for identifying the suspect. U.S. v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) April '08 LED:06 (No; for those gross misdemeanors and misdemeanors that do not have potential for ongoing or repeated danger or risk of escalation, a Terry stop is not justified, at least if there is a reasonable alternative for identifying the suspect. Per our LED editorial comments re Grigg, we believe this restriction does not include those misdemeanors that are listed in RCW 10.31.100 as exceptions to the “in the presence” arrest rule.)

13. May possible witnesses be seized under Terry?

Generally no, though exigent circumstances may justify.

State v. Carney, 142 Wn. App. 197 (Div. II, 2008) Feb. '08 LED:17 (Not as to witnesses to possible reckless driving, but perhaps under narrow, compelling circumstances rules a 3-judge panel that issues 3 separate opinions).

State v. Dorey, 145 Wn. App. 423 (Div. III, 2008) August '08 LED:08 (Officer's seizure of potential witness was not justified where there were no exigent circumstances, not even a report of a recently committed crime; Court notes that American Law Institute Model Code for Pre-arraignment Procedures indicates witnesses may be seized if all four of the following circumstances exist: (1) the crime was very recently committed, (2) it involves forcible injury to person or damage to property or theft, (3) there is probable cause to believe that the witness has helpful information, and (4) temporary detention is reasonably necessary to get the information);

State v. Barron, 176 Wn. App. 742 (Div. III, 2012) Jan. '13 LED:14 (Exigency for witness seizure ruled where officer reasonably believed that person was either victim or witness or perpetrator in knife fight moments before officer arrived)

State v. Rubio, 185 Wn. App. 387 (Div. III, Jan. 8, 2015) – February '15 LED:11 (Seizure of “witness” upheld where man did not exit apartment as directed during police investigation of a reported physical domestic dispute)

14. *When does a “seizure” become an “arrest”? (Case law is a bit inconsistent, in part because State and defense sometimes argue opposite sides of the issue, depending on whether “probable cause” is at issue or “search incident” authority is at issue)*

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) July '79 LED:01 (Involuntary transport to stationhouse for questioning is per se an arrest)

State v. Belieu, 112 Wn.2d 587 (1989) Sept. '89 LED:17, and State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143 (Div. I, 1995) March '96 LED:09 (Felony stop procedures not necessarily an “arrest” – depends on circumstances; not arrest here where persons in stopped car were reasonably suspected of being home invasion robbers)

State v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230 (1987) Aug. '87 LED:08 (Two-block transport of burglary suspect to scene of suspected burglary for show-up ID not an arrest under the circumstances; reviewed on totality of circumstances, considering: (1) length of time, (2) place of detention, (3) extent of movement of detainee, (4) need for moving suspect, (5) nature of restraints, (6) fact that officers were investigating a recently reported crime)

State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43 (Div. III, 2004) March '04 LED:11 (Putting suspended driver in back seat of patrol car and telling him he is under arrest held not a “custodial arrest” for “search incident” purposes where he was not frisked, searched, or handcuffed, and he was allowed to use cell phone while sitting in the patrol car)

B. The Information, Or Level-Of-Suspicion, Continuum; Plus Pretext

1. *What constitutes articulable “reasonable suspicion”?*

Definition: In light of specific and articulable facts, would a reasonable officer, considering his or her experience and training, reasonably believe that a suspect has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity; this objective standard depends on the totality of the circumstances, and can result from a combination of facts, even if each fact taken alone is individually innocuous.

State v. Moreno, 173 Wn. App. 479 (Div. III, February 12, 2013) April '13 LED:15 (In night-time response to several shots-fired reports, reasonable suspicion supports Terry stop of spotlighted possible gang member driver wearing red in blue-colors rival gang area and driving quickly down a rutted alley)

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) March '00 LED:02 (U.S. Supreme Court holds that unprovoked, headlong flight at sight of police car by person in area known for heavy drug trafficking is “reasonable suspicion” under the “totality of the circumstances”)

Terry's reasonable suspicion standard: A Ninth Circuit panel has ruled that two fact elements – (1) anonymous tip that a well-described black man was walking in a Seattle neighborhood in possession of a gun, plus (2) the man's flight when the man saw that King County Metro Officers were following him with their emergency flashers activated – did not add up to reasonable suspicion to stop the man under Terry. U.S. v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir., June 5, 2019)

State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 70 (2010) Nov. '10 LED:04 (Where the sole apparent basis for police officers' labeling of a house as a "known drug house" was the neighbors' reports of heavy short-stay traffic to the house, a suspect's less-than-two-minute visit to that "known drug house" at 3:20 a.m. by a suspect unknown to police officers did not provide reasonable suspicion of drug crime and hence did not justify a stop of the suspect's car)

State v. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149 (May 7, 2015) (consolidated cases of Fuentes and Sandoz) June '15 LED:03 (Fuentes: Reasonable suspicion standard met in pattern of short-stay visits to drug-involved apartment plus suspect's short-stay visit in which she carried into the apartment a relatively full plastic bag and carried out of the apartment a less-full plastic bag; Sandoz: State falls short of reasonable suspicion standard with pale, nervous suspect coming from drug-involved apartment)

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) May '00 LED:07 (U.S. Supreme Court holds that anonymous phone call regarding young man in plaid shirt at bus stop with a gun failed to meet the "reasonable suspicion" test, and therefore seizure and frisk was unlawful)

Navarette v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (April 22, 2014) – June '14 LED:03 (Anonymous 911 call claiming that pickup truck had just run caller's car off the road held by U.S. Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment to provide reasonable suspicion justifying a stop for ongoing crime of DUI despite lack of corroboration of erratic driving)

State v. Howerton, 187 Wn. App. 357 (Div. I, March 30, 2015) (Reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop held established: Citizen informant is presumed credible where she made cell phone call to 911, identified herself and reported that, from her house, she had witnessed a described suspect break in to a van across the street from her house; and 911 passed information on to officer who then corroborated the report)

State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d 497 (July 16, 2015) July '15 LED:04 (911 calls, officers' talk with on-scene witness and attempt to corroborate report about possible underage gun possession involving a bald young man and involving a described vehicle, neither of which descriptions were corroborated by officers, held not to add up to reasonable suspicion for investigative stop)

State v. Cardenas-Muratalla, 179 Wn. App. 307 (Div. I, Feb. 3, 2014) – May '14 LED:19 (Anonymous call about non-threatening man with a gun in a high crime area of Seattle did not provide reasonable suspicion for Terry stop)

U.S. v. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2010) July '10 LED:11 (In-person report by unknown, unidentified UPS driver held to be reliable in support of reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop)

Campbell v. DOL, 31 Wn. App. 833 (Div. I, 1982) Aug. '82 LED:04 (Conclusory statement to officer that driver of car going by is “drunk” does not justify stop, nature of crime and alternative investigative options are factors in reasonableness-of-seizure determination)

State v. Anderson, 51 Wn. App. 775 (Div. III, 1988) Oct. '88 LED:10 (Known citizen's action of pointing out car and making weaving gesture justified stop)

State v. Jones, 85 Wn. App. 797 (Div. III, 1997) Aug. '97 LED:16 (Unknown driver of marked commercial vehicle was not a sufficiently reliable source, even though he had made an in-person report). **But see State v. Lee, 147 Wn. App. 912 (Div. I, 2008) Feb. '09 LED:11 (Corroborated citizen's report constituted reasonable suspicion; Court questions part of the analysis in the 1997 Jones decision by Division Three)**

State v. Morrell, ___ Wn. App. 2d ___, 482 P.3d 295 (Div. III, March 9, 2021) Reasonable suspicion standard held not met for Terry stop of suspected drug-dealer where an arrestee spontaneously told police the name of her drug-dealer, but police, who knew that the person identified by the arrestee-informant was involved in illegal drug activity, did not – at least to the satisfaction of the Court of Appeals panel – sufficiently corroborate her allegation.

Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (April 6, 2020) (Where – (1) officer ran the license plate on a moving vehicle and learned that the registered owner's license had been revoked, and (2) the officer had no information indicating that the registered owner was not the driver – the officer had reasonable suspicion supporting a stop of the vehicle to investigate for driving revoked)

State v. Lyons, 85 Wn. App. 268 (Div. II, 1997) Aug. '97 LED:18 (Holding that RCW 46.20.349 constitutionally authorizes stop of vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that registered owner of MV has revoked or suspended driver's license). But see State v. Penfield, 106 Wn. App. 157 (Div. III, 2001) Aug. '01 LED:12, which holds that, while a MV stop to check for the registered owner was permissible under the Lyons-type facts, the officer was not permitted to extend the stop to ask for ID when the reasonable suspicion evaporated once the officer noticed that the driver could not be the person identified by records as the registered owner.

State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335 (1992) April '92 LED:02 (Officers should not make irrelevant statements about the person's racial incongruity with the neighborhood)

State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143 (Div. I, 1995) March '96 LED:09 (Holding dangerous suspect at gunpoint not necessarily an arrest; case also addresses “reasonable suspicion” question regarding a handgun that a citizen was carrying in his hand while walking in a residential area)

U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) April '02 LED:02 (Totality of circumstances, including officer’s experience and training, must be considered by the courts)

State v. Prado, 145 Wn. App. 646 (Div. I, 2008) Sept. '08 LED:16 (Traffic stop held by Court of Appeals to not be justified where driver crossed 8-inch-wide, exit-lane divider by 2 tire-widths for 1 second - - RCW 46.61.140(1) leaves some leeway because it provides that a person shall drive “as nearly as practicable within a single lane”); **State v. Jones, 186 Wn. App. 786 (Div. I, April 6, 2015) May '15 LED:04 (Under Prado, a car’s three brief passes over the fog line by about an inch each time, without more evidence, did not support stop based on RCW 46.61.140(1) in light of statute’s “as nearly as practicable” language; nor does this evidence alone - - with no supporting experience and training testimony by an officer involved in making the stop - - provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving that would support a vehicle stop) (Note: The solution to the problem posed by Prado and Jones may be for the officer and prosecutor to rely on RCW 46.61.670 as authority to stop for crossing fog line)**

Compare the decisions in Prado and Jones with the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Huffman, 185 Wn. App. 98 (Div. I, Dec. 22, 2014) January '15 LED:03 (Court of Appeals distinguishes the Huffman decision as being limited to interpretation of RCW 46.61.140 and upholds officer’s stop where driver went over center line and no statutory provision expressly authorized the driver to make that deviation). See also State v. Kocher, 199 Wn. App. 336 (Div. I, June 26, 2017) (Officer’s stop upheld where (1) driver went over fog line, and (2) no statutory provision expressly authorized that deviation by the driver; Court of Appeals construes RCW 46.61.670 and RCW 46.61.140.)

State v. McLean, 178 Wn. App. 236 (Div. II, Oct. 22, 2013) March '14 LED:21 (Reasonable suspicion found for DUI stop in experienced trooper’s observation of weaving within lane and crossing fog line three times, where officer explained how his long experience and his training supported his decision to stop the driver to investigate a possible DUI)

State v. Creed, 179 Wn. App. 534 (Div. III, Feb. 20, 2014) June '14 LED:15 (Officer’s misreading of license plate, which returned as stolen, does not provide reasonable articulable suspicion for traffic stop)

2. *What constitutes “probable cause” to arrest?*

Definition: Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances would convince a reasonable officer that he or she has reasonable grounds to

believe that a suspect has committed or is committing a crime based on articulable and specific circumstances that support the conclusion; it is an objective, “reasonable officer” standard based on the totality of the circumstances considering the time, place, and other circumstances, including the officer’s experience and training. It is a higher standard than “reasonable suspicion” and a lower standard than either the (1) “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for criminal prosecutions, or (2) the “preponderance” standard that is used to resolve fact questions in civil lawsuits.

State v. Rose, 175 Wn.2d 10 (Aug. 9, 2012) Oct. ’12 LED:07 (Washington Supreme Court finds probable cause to arrest for possession of controlled substance where officer observed a glass tube, consistent with a tube that could be used to ingest illegal drugs, containing a white chalky substance (even though the arrest was originally characterized by the officer as being for mere possession of drug paraphernalia, which is a nonexistent crime under Washington state statutes; the facts that were known to the officer, not his or her labeling of the crime of arrest, are what determines whether arrest was supported by probable cause)

State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449 (1984) Nov. ’84 LED:11 (Aguilar-Spinelli standard controls informant-based PC standard under independent grounds reading of State constitution)

State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135 (2008) Sept. ’08 LED:07 (Moderate odor of marijuana coming from vehicle during traffic stop did not provide probable cause to arrest passenger under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution. But arrest of driver of single-occupant vehicle apparently would still be justified based on smell of drugs and constructive possession theory; see discussion in State v. Wright, 155 Wn. App. 537 (Div. I, 2010 June ’10 LED:12, reversed on other grounds, State v. Snapp, 172 Wn.2d 177 (2012) May ’12 LED:25.)

3. *Is there a “pretext stop” prohibition?*

Yes, under the Washington constitution, article I, section 7.

Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) Aug. ’96 LED:09 (U.S. Supreme Court holds under Fourth Amendment that there is no pretext stop rule; probable cause as to violation justifies stop regardless of officer’s motive). However, on July 1, 1999, in State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343 (1999) Sept. ’99 LED:05, the Washington State Supreme Court interpreted article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution as imposing a pretext stop prohibition, the violation of which can be proven through either: (1) subjective evidence (showing the officer had a pretextual motive through his or her own admissions or based on circumstantial evidence), or (2) objective evidence (showing the officer didn’t follow normal or standard practices and procedures for that officer); See also State v. DeSantiago, 97 Wn. App. 446 (Div. III, 1999) Nov. ’99 LED:12 (Court applies Ladson pretext rule to suppress evidence seized by patrol officer following a pretext stop)

State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284 (Dec. 20, 2012) March ’13 LED:07 A patrol officer’s

mixed-motive vehicle stop is held not pretextual because he: (1) had an articulable, reasonable suspicion of muffler violation; and (2) consciously and independently determined the stop was needed to address the muffler violation. The Arreola majority opinion explains:

“A mixed-motive stop does not violate article I, section 7 so long as the police officer making the stop exercises discretion appropriately. Thus, if a police officer makes an independent and conscious determination that a traffic stop to address a suspected traffic infraction is reasonably necessary in furtherance of traffic safety and the general welfare, the stop is not pretextual. That remains true even if the legitimate reason for the stop is secondary and the officer is motivated primarily by a hunch or some other reason that is insufficient to justify a stop. In such a case, the legitimate ground is an independent cause of the stop, and privacy is justifiably disturbed due to the need to enforce traffic regulations, as determined by an appropriate exercise of police discretion. Any additional reason or motivation of the officer does not affect privacy in such a case, nor does it interfere with the underlying exercise of police discretion, because the officer would have stopped the vehicle regardless. The trial court should consider the presence of an illegitimate reason or motivation when determining whether the officer really stopped the vehicle for a legitimate and independent reason (and thus would have conducted the traffic stop regardless). But a police officer cannot and should not be expected to simply ignore the fact that an appropriate and reasonably necessary traffic stop might also advance a related and more important police investigation. . . . In such a case, an officer’s motivation to remain observant and potentially advance a related investigation does not taint the legitimate basis for the stop, so long as discretion is appropriately exercised and the scope of the stop remains reasonably limited based on its lawful justification.

. . . . The trial court should consider both subjective intent and objective circumstances in order to determine whether the police officer actually exercised discretion appropriately. The trial court’s inquiry should be limited to whether investigation of criminal activity or a traffic infraction (or multiple infractions), for which the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion, was an actual, conscious, and independent cause of the traffic stop. The presence of illegitimate reasons for the stop often will be relevant to that inquiry, but the focus must remain on the alleged legitimate reason for the stop and whether it was an actual, conscious, and independent cause.”

State v. Hoang, 101 Wn. App. 732 (Div. I, 2000) Nov. ’00 LED: 08 (Court upholds trial court finding of “NO pretext” where officer testified believably that, though he had other suspicions as well, he made stop for traffic enforcement reasons; officer’s failure to issue citation after finding illegal drugs is not per se evidence of pretext);

State v. Quezadas-Gomez, 165 Wn. App. 593 (Div. II, 2011) June ’12 LED:21 (Court of Appeals rules that there was no pretext problem where officers with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a felony drug crime stopped his car only to identify him and did not cite or arrest him for anything)

Note as to arrest warrants and search warrants: State v. Davis, 35 Wn. App. 724 (Div. I, 1983) Jan. ’84 LED:06 (Court holds in pre-Ladson decision that arrest on a valid warrant can never be pretextual); State v. Goodin, 67 Wn. App. 623 (Div. II, 1993) March ’93

LED:17 (Same rule for entry on search warrant); State v. Busig, 119 Wn. App. 381 (Div. III, 2003) Feb. '04 LED:16 (Search under a search warrant that was issued to allow officers to search a third party's residence to make an arrest on an arrest warrant held not subject to pretext challenge); State v. Lansden, 144 Wn.2d 654 (2001) Nov. '01 LED:03 (Same ruling regarding administrative search warrant). **But see State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390 (2007) Oct. '07 LED:06 (Washington Supreme Court rules under the Washington constitution that forcible entry to arrest on gross misdemeanor warrant will be reviewed for pretext. It is not clear whether the Court would extend the Hatchie rule for pretext review to forcible entry to arrest on a felony arrest warrant.)**

C. Frisk Authority And Related Officer-safety Issues

1. *What constitutes reasonable belief of danger?*

State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168 (1993) July '93 LED:07 (Court says question is, on totality of circumstances, whether the officer had a founded suspicion such that frisk was "not arbitrary or harassing")

State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386 (2001) Oct. '01 LED:05 (Because driver leaned over toward front-seat passenger as officer was conducting a radio check during a 1:15 a.m. traffic stop, the passenger was subject to a lawful frisk once the officer learned of and acted on information that the driver was subject to custodial arrest based on arrest warrants and based on driving while license suspended).

Compare State v. Flores, 186 Wn.2d 506 (September 15, 2016) Sept. '16 LED:04 (Discussing Horrace in a case involving an arrest of a person who was walking down the street with a companion, Supreme Court declares that officer would not have had authority to frisk, but, because officer had an "objective rationale predicated on safety concerns" to seize a companion to secure the scene of an arrest, article I, section 7 of the Washington state constitution allowed for the seizure of the companion even though the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity by the companion under the standard of Terry v. Ohio.)

State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wn.2d 621 (2008) July '08 LED:06 (Officer could not lawfully frisk a lawfully seized man based solely on fact that the man was nervous and fidgeting when confronted by the officer); **Compare State v. Ibrahim, 164 Wn. App. 503 (Div. III, 2011) April '12 LED:20 (Frisk held justified in light of suspect's earlier presence in suspected stolen vehicle, plus his nervous behavior and continued ignoring of officer's requests that he keep his hands in view, not turn away, and not approach the officer)**

United States v. I.E.V., 705 F.3d 430 (9th Cir., Nov. 28, 2012) Feb. '13 LED:07 (2-1 majority concludes that: (1) delay in frisking suspect undercuts government's argument that frisk was justified by reasonable belief of danger; and (2) in any

event, government failed to present evidence to show that lifting suspect's shirt was done for safety reason)

2. *What is the permissible scope of a frisk?*

State v. Horton, 136 Wn. App. 29 (Div. III, 2006) Jan. '07 LED:02 (Court of Appeals held that a cigarette pack could not have contained a weapon and therefore should not have been searched as part of a frisk) But see U.S. v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) Nov. '06 LED:02 (Officer's testimony about potential for small weapons convinces 9th Circuit that Altoids tin could have contained weapon and hence could be searched in frisk)

State v. Russell, 180 Wn.2d 860 (July 10, 2014) September '14:07 (Washington Supreme Court held that officer-safety considerations did not support search of six-by-four-by-one-to-two-inch lightweight, hard, opaque box lawfully taken from detainee's pocket; this appears to be more restrictive than Fourth Amendment doctrine, so Russell appears to be an independent grounds ruling under the Washington constitution, article I, section 7)

3. *Is the test exclusively objective or is there a subjective element?*

One intermediate appellate court decision held there are both objective and subjective elements to the test in Washington, so officers should be prepared to explain that they were actually concerned for safety. State v. Coutier, 78 Wn. App. 239 (Div. III, 1995) Oct. '95 LED:04 (Court asserts that if officer not concerned about safety, then frisk not justified even if reasonable officer would have been; appears to be erroneous subjective standard, but officer might have avoided by testifying as to training and experience)

4. *May frisk be search for evidence?*

No. State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App. 362 (Div. I, 1995) Feb. '96 LED:11 (Suspicion, falling short of probable cause, that person may have secreted drugs in pocket doesn't justify frisking or searching pocket)

5. *May driver at stop routinely be directed into or out of MV?*

Yes. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1 (1986) Dec. '86 LED:01 (Apparently adopting U.S. Supreme Court view – Pa. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) – that driver can be directed out of MV without articulable grounds). State v. Belieu, 112 Wn.2d 587 (1989) Sept. '89 LED:17 (Citing Mimms for the above principle)

6. *May passengers routinely be directed into or out of MV?*

No, not under the Washington constitution (Yes, under Fourth Amendment). Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) April '97 LED:02. (The U.S. Supreme Court

holds by a 7-2 decision that Pa. v. Mimms applies to give officer automatic authority to order a passenger out of a lawfully stopped MV). But see State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208 (1999) March '99 LED:04 (In an "independent grounds" ruling under Washington constitution, article I, section 7, Washington Supreme Court holds that, while officers have automatic or "bright line" authority to direct *drivers* out of, or back into, their vehicles during routine traffic stops, under a newly announced "heightened awareness of danger" test (apparently a less stringent test than the frisk standard), officers must be able to articulate an objective reason for directing *passengers* (*where such passengers themselves have committed no violation*) out of, or back into, vehicles in such routine traffic stops)

State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282 (2001) Oct. '01 LED:08 (Officer may order those in the vehicle to get out if anyone in the vehicle is going to be subjected to a custodial arrest)

7. When may MV's be "frisked"?

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) Sept. '83 LED:08 (Frisk under same safety standard as governs frisk of person); see also State v. Belieu, cited above at I.C.5.

State v. Glossbrener, 146 Wn.2d 670 (2002) Sept. '02 LED:07 (Frisk of car held not justified under objective standard where, after observing driver lean over front-passenger seat while pulling over at outset of traffic stop, officer did not frisk car immediately, but instead: (1) left suspect in suspect's car and returned to patrol car to run radio check for warrants, and then (2) did FST's – which suspect successfully performed – before calling for back-up and doing a car frisk)

State v. Cruz, 195 Wn. App. 120 (Div. III, September 22, 2016) Sept. '16 LED:07 (Officer's protective search of arrestee's vehicle for firearms that officer knew to be in vehicle held not justified under Terry or under exigent circumstances exception because the circumstances at the recreational fishing parking area did not justify officer's perception of danger). Status of Court of Appeals ruling as precedent: Unclear. The Washington Supreme Court granted review but then concluded that the State had failed earlier in the case to preserve its right to seek review of the trial court's suppression ruling. See 189 Wn.2d 588 (2017).

U.S. v. Ngumezi, ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL ___ (9th Cir., November 20, 2020) (Under the Fourth Amendment, officers making a traffic stop may not open a car door and lean inside if the officers do not have a reasonable belief of danger posed by someone inside the car; such an "entry" of the protected private space of the car is a search that must be supported by a search warrant or an exception to the constitutional search warrant requirement.)

8. When is a residence or a business premises subject to "protective sweep"?

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) May '90 LED:02 (Officer safety is the justification – there must be individualized reasonable suspicion that others may be in residence and may pose danger to officers)

State v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 593 (Div. III, 2004) Feb. '05 LED:10 (Court of Appeals holds that there was not individualized reasonable suspicion that others were in residence and could pose danger to officers)

State v. Chambers, 197 Wn. App. 96 (Div. I, Dec. 1, 2016) Dec. '16 LED:04 (Protective sweep issue resolved against the State, but trial court's error held to be harmless)

9. *Are there cross-gender pat-down considerations?*

No, not in a non-jail/prison setting, but be reasonable in word and deed, and try generally to use same- gender officer when same-gender officer is present.

10. *When does “plain feel” justify seizure of evidence?*

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), Sept. '93 LED:15; State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107 (1994), Oct. '94 LED:06 (U.S. Supreme Court and Washington Supreme Court state restrictive standard for “plain feel” seizure; officer must recognize nature of contraband with tactile sense at or before completion of frisk and without turning the probe into a search for anything but weapons). **But see State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242 (2009) July '09 LED:18 (Seizure of drugs based on “plain feel” through pants coin pocket held unlawful because officer manipulated baggie after eliminating the baggie as a possible weapon)**

11. *May frisk be done by emptying suspects' pockets, rather than patting them?*

No. State v. Fowler, 76 Wn. App. 168 (Div. III, 1994) May '95 LED:14 (No “single scoop”)

12. *Are there limits on when officer can accompany an arrestee into private premises following arrest?*

Yes. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814 (1984) April '84 LED:01 (Under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, the mere fact of an MIP arrest doesn't justify entry into 11th floor WSU dorm room in the absence of other articulable suspicions; the Chrisman decision is limited somewhat by its factual context, but officers should get consent or at least warn a person who wants to re-enter his or her private residence following arrest – for example, to put on pants, to let the cat out, or put out the fire in the fireplace – that the officer will retain control of the arrestee upon re-entry of the residence)

13. *Frisking during warrant execution – see II.B.2 below*

14. *Securing weapons*

State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669 (Div. II, 1994) May '95 LED:15 (Weapons may always be secured while officers conduct lawful search)

D. Arrest Authority

See also II.D and E below re: “search incident to arrest”

1. *Misdemeanor presence rule and other limits on arresting or citing persons under RCW 10.31.100 and CrR 2.11 and RCW 46.63.030*

State v. Green, 150 Wn.2d 740 (2004) March '04 LED:08; May '04 LED:02 (Washington Supreme Court held as a matter of statutory interpretation that failure to transfer title is not a “continuing offense,” and therefore arrest and “search incident” were unlawful); State v. Walker, 129 Wn. App. 572 (Div. III, 2005) Nov. '05 LED:22 (Court of Appeals extended Green's arrest restriction to Terry stops). **But the 2008 Washington Legislature nullified the appellate court rulings in Green and Walker by expressly providing that failure to transfer title is a continuing offense.**

State v. Holmes, 135 Wn. App. 588 (Div. II, 2006) Dec. '06 LED:19 (Custodial arrest upheld for driving with expired trip permit because this is an offense with driving as an element and the crime was being committed in the officer's presence)

Staats v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 757 (2000) Dec. '00 LED:21 (Under CrRLJ 2.1(b), criminal citation may not be issued at the scene by an officer unless the officer would be justified in making a custodial arrest for that crime)

State v. Magee, 167 Wn.2d 639 (2009) Feb. '10 LED:23 (Where the infraction of second degree negligent driving did not occur in the presence of a law enforcement officer, officer could not lawfully issue a citation for that infraction – a concurring opinion by one Supreme Court Justice notes that prosecutor could have cited/charged the violator)

State v. Ortega, 177 Wn.2d 116 (March 21, 2013) June '13 LED:19 (Arrest for gross misdemeanor violation of Seattle drug-loitering ordinance held not to meet RCW 10.31.100 misdemeanor presence requirement, because crime did not occur in presence of officer who made arrest, and observing officer was not involved in making arrest; Court declares “police team” rule does not apply in analyzing whether misdemeanor presence requirement is met. Note that chapter 5, Laws of 2014, addressed Ortega by amending RCW 10.31.100 to provide that misdemeanor presence requirement is met if offense is committed in the presence of any officer.)

Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir., Feb. 8, 2013) June '13 LED:16 (Even though probable cause existed for the plaintiff's arrest, the plaintiff's section 1983 claim that the arrest violated his First Amendment right to be free from police acts motivated by retaliation motive must go to trial. Plaintiff, who was violating a city noise ordinance, was repeatedly told that if he cooperated and did not “run his mouth” he would be released with a ticket, but he would be booked if he “acted a fool.” Beware of the Ford Court's discussion of CrRLJ 2.1(b)(2)(ii)'s

“release factors” - - concerns about 1) ID, 2) protecting safety or property or peace, 3) lack of ties to community or other indicators of non-response to citation, or 4) prior FTAs - - as a limitation on discretionary arrest)

2. Verification of warrant’s existence required for arrest on an arrest warrant

An arrest was held to have not been supported by an arrest warrant where it had been at least two weeks since any officer had verified the current existence of the warrant. State v. Pines, 17 Wn. App. 2d 483 (Div. I, May 17, 2021). Note that officers should also reasonably verify that the person being arrested is the person named on the arrest warrant.

3. Extraterritorial arrest authority within Washington borders

a. RCW 10.93.070 provides:

In addition to any other powers vested by law, a general authority Washington peace officer who possesses a certificate of basic law enforcement training or a certificate of equivalency or has been exempted from the requirement therefor by the Washington state criminal justice training commission may enforce the traffic or criminal laws of this state throughout the territorial bounds of this state, under the following enumerated circumstances: (1) Upon the prior written consent of the sheriff or chief of police in whose primary territorial jurisdiction the exercise of the powers occurs; (2) In response to an emergency involving an immediate threat to human life or property; (3) In response to a request for assistance pursuant to a mutual law enforcement assistance agreement with the agency of primary territorial jurisdiction or in response to the request of a peace officer with enforcement authority; (4) When the officer is transporting a prisoner; (5) When the officer is executing an arrest warrant or search warrant; or (6) When the officer is in fresh pursuit, as defined in RCW 10.93.120. [NOTE: fresh pursuit is authorized both as to criminal offenses and as to traffic infractions]

State v. King, 167 Wn.2d 324 (2009) Dec. ’09 LED:21 (Reckless driving does not qualify per se as “an emergency involving an immediate threat to human life or property” under RCW 10.93.070(2); particular facts of case must be assessed)

NOTE: If an officer makes an arrest outside the officer’s territory, then the officer is limited in authority to that of a citizen making an arrest. See State v. Harp, 13 Wn. App. 239 (Div. I, 1975).

b. Beware of tagging along on other-jurisdiction warrant without consent letter

In State v. Bartholomew, 56 Wn. App. 617 (Div. I, 1990) April ’90 LED:03, the Court of Appeals held that RCW 10.93.070(5) did not authorize Seattle P.D. officers – who were not part of a task force with Tacoma and were not acting under a consent letter from the Tacoma chief or Pierce County Sheriff – to tag along on a Pierce County warrant being

executed in Tacoma by Tacoma P.D. officers. In State v. Rasmussen, 70 Wn. App. 853 (Div. I, 1993) April '94 LED:12, however, the Court held that officers with a consent letter from the chief of police or sheriff of another jurisdiction are not restricted by the rationale of Bartholomew from taking action in that other jurisdiction.

3. *Interstate pursuit into Oregon and Idaho*

A WSP trooper, while in Washington on the freeway near Oregon, both (1) observed a driver commit traffic infractions (but did not observe evidence of DUI), and (2) signaled him to stop. The driver, who turned out to be intoxicated, did not stop for the pursuing trooper until reaching Oregon. An Oregon intermediate appellate court ruled that the stop was unlawful. See State v. Keller, 278 Or. App. 760 (Or. Ct. App., June 15, 2016). However, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and held that the stop was lawful because, even though the relevant Oregon statute on interstate fresh pursuit did not authorize the stop, under the totality of the circumstances the trooper acted reasonably. See State v. Keller, 361 Or. 566 (Or. S. Ct. June 22, 2017).

Idaho's statute on interstate fresh pursuit is broader than Oregon's but not so broad as to support a seizure in Idaho under Keller-type facts. In In Re Richie, 127 Wn. App. 935 (Div. III, 2005) August 2005 LED:11, Division Three of the Washington Court of Appeals held that the Idaho law on interstate fresh pursuit justified a WSP trooper's pursuit and seizure of DUI suspect at an Idaho hospital based on reasonable suspicion of DUI that the trooper developed before going into Idaho after the suspect. Even though the Idaho statute on its face appears to limit interstate fresh pursuit to felonies, the Washington court cited an Idaho court decision, State v. Ruhter, 688 P.2d 1187 (Idaho 1984), that interpreted the Idaho statute as extending to DUI fresh pursuit from Washington into Idaho.)

4. *Arrest in Washington for felonies committed in other states.*

RCW 10.88.330 – Arrest of person charged with felony in the courts of another state is expressly authorized by this statute.

Common law – There is no Washington case directly deciding the issue but there is case law elsewhere that an arrest can be made based solely on probable cause as to felony committed in other state (State v. Klein, 130 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1964)), but there is some suggestion in cases from other jurisdictions that express statutory authority is required (note that RCW 10.31.100 may or may not qualify as such statutory authority) – if at all practicable, get legal advice in the case at hand before arresting without a warrant in this circumstance.

II. SEARCH WITH, WITHOUT A WARRANT

A. **Defining “Search” – Privacy Protection; Plus Understanding The Concepts Of “Open View” And “Plain View”**

1. “Open view” and “plain view” concepts

Many Washington appellate court cases refer to “open view” as the test of whether a “search” has occurred for constitutional purposes. No “search” occurs if the officer is lawfully in a position outside of a protected private area and is able to make observations into the protected area using only his or her own senses or using only permissible sense enhancements. Such “open view” observations do not justify immediate entry into the protected area unless one of the exceptions to the constitutional search warrant requirement (e.g., exigency) apply. **See State v. Jones, 163 Wn. App. 354 (Div. II, 2011) Feb. '12 LED:19; State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94 (Div. III, 2000) Feb. '01 LED:02; see also discussion of this issue in January 2011 LED at page 3 and in April 2011 LED at pages 13-14.**

“Plain view” under the Fourth Amendment case law from the United States Supreme Court justifies immediate seizure of evidence. It is an exception to the search warrant requirement. Plain view was formerly said to have three elements: (1) lawful presence of an officer in the area (including the officer being located in a public area, e.g., on a public street, that is not constitutionally protected); (2) immediate recognition (under a probable cause standard) of an item as evidence or contraband; and (3) *inadvertence in coming across the item*.

In Horton v. Calif., 496 U.S. 128 (1990) Aug. '90 LED:02, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no third element of “inadvertence.” In State v. Goodin, 67 Wn. App. 623 (Div. II, 1992) March '93 LED:17, and in State v. Hoggatt, 108 Wn. App. 257, 270 (Div. II, 2001), Division Two of our Court of Appeals agreed. See also the State Supreme Court decision in State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107 (1994) Oct. '94 LED:06 (State Supreme Court recognizes Horton test in “plain feel” case. (NOTE: “Plain feel” discussed above at I.C.10.) **In State v. Morgan, 193 Wn.2d 365 (May 16, 2019), all nine Washington State Supreme Court justices agreed that the plain view doctrine does not require “inadvertence,” and a 7-2 majority agreed that the seizing officer had sufficient probable cause under the plain view doctrine to justify seizing an assault-arson suspect’s opaque clothing bag at the hospital and removing the clothes.**

In State v. Elwell, ___ Wn.2d ___, 2022 WL ___ (March 3, 2022), the Washington Supreme Court declared in the lead Elwell Opinion that the Court was applying the Fourth Amendment and was not making an independent grounds interpretation of the Washington constitution, article I, section 7. Then the Court incorrectly used the phrase “open view” in a ruling that logically falls under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine of “plain view.” Addressing the plain view doctrine’s “immediately apparent” requirement, the Washington Supreme Court ruled distinguished factually its 2019 ruling in Elwell. The Supreme Court held that an officer’s probable cause that an item being pushed down the street on a dolly was stolen property did not justify the officer’s removal of a blanket from the item to confirm the officer’s suspicion. At the point when the officer removed the blanket, the officer had probable cause as to the

evidentiary value of the item, but the identity of the object under the blanket was ambiguous. In essence, the Elwell Court's ruling, without citation to supporting U.S. Supreme Court case law was that knowledge of the identity of the object is required to justify removing an opaque covering in this circumstance. The Legal Update editor believes that the U.S. Supreme Court would not require such a requirement of certainty under the Fourth Amendment "plain view" doctrine. But, of course, Washington government actors are stuck with this rule. An officer apparently may, however, (1) lawfully make a warrantless, un-consenting seizure of the blanketed item based on probable cause as to its evidentiary value; and (2) then expeditiously apply for a search warrant to remove the blanket and determine the identity of the item.

2. *Entry of curtilage of residence not apparently open to the public (i.e., for which entry there is no implied invitation) is a "search"; time of day and nature of police activity can make a difference as to whether there is implied invitation.*

Definition of curtilage: At common law and under the Fourth Amendment, the curtilage of a residence is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of home and the privacies of life and therefore has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Courts have defined by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private. No single factor is determinative of the question of the scope of the curtilage: whether the place searched is within the curtilage is to be determined from the facts, including its proximity or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion within the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling (e.g., fenced and gated for privacy), and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to the domestic economy of the family. State v. Pourtes, 49 Wn. App. 579 (Div. III, 1987).

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Jardines holds that a resident cannot be deemed to have extended an implied invitation for officers to go into the curtilage of the front porch where the sole reason for entry into the area was investigation and not to contact a person at the residence. The controlling opinion's trespass-based 4th Amendment theory holds that police exceeded the scope of the home resident's implied invitation for visitors to come onto front porch where officer and K-9 went onto porch, not for the purpose of talking to the resident, but instead for the objectively manifested purpose of conducting search, by having K-9 sniff for marijuana grow. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (March 26, 2013) June '13 LED:06.

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the Florida v. Jardines rule as meaning that in some circumstances, merely going to a suspect's front door can be an unlawful search. The Court held that evidence that resulted from suspected kidnapper's reaction to officers' 4 a.m. knock at front door was inadmissible; going to his door at that hour with the intent to make a warrantless arrest was held to be a "search" and to be not justified on the facts under the Fourth Amendment

doctrines for knock-and-talk or exigent circumstances or protective sweep. United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir., March 22, 2016) March '16 LED:03

State v. Hoke, 72 Wn. App. 869 (Div. I, 1994) Jan. '95 LED:06 (Entry of brush-and-junk-shielded yard of home unlawfully invaded “curtilage” because officer went farther than a reasonably respectful citizen would go). **COMPARE** State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333 (Div. II, 1995) Aug. '95 LED:14 (“No trespassing” signs alone generally don’t establish constitutional privacy protection that would prohibit officers from knocking on the front door during the daytime) with State v. Boethin, 126 Wn. App. 695 (Div. II, 2005) June '05 LED:05 (Officer’s leaving of the porch area to sniff at the closed doors of an adjoining garage invaded the privacy rights of the resident under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution).

State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304 (2000) Sept. '00 LED:02 (Late-night hour, lack of intent to contact resident, and lack of “legitimate police business” added up to a violation of Fourth Amendment and state constitutional privacy rights where undercover officers went into the impliedly open rear driveway of a residence at midnight to sniff at the garage for a suspected “marijuana grow”)

State v. Dyreson, 104 Wn. App. 703 (Div. III, 2001) May '01 LED:15 (Enclosed garage gets protection against warrantless police entry even though: (1) door open, (2) loud music inside, and (3) renter directed officer to look for owner-resident inside garage)

3. *Unlike Fourth Amendment, there is no broad “open fields” exception to privacy protection under Washington constitution*

State v. Johnson, 75 Wn. App. 692 (Div. II, 1994) Jan. '95 LED:19 (Rural farm owner with fenced and gated property, posted with “No Trespassing” signs, had Washington state constitutional privacy protection even though the area was not within the home’s curtilage)

State v. Thorson, 98 Wn. App. 528 (Div. I, 1999) Feb. '00 LED:02 (Unfenced, un-posted, heavily-wooded property with orchard on remote rural island was protected from warrantless search under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution; community expectations on island appear to be a significant factor in the Court’s ruling; the area was not within the home’s curtilage and not a protected area under the Fourth Amendment)

State v. Littlefair, 129 Wn. App. 330 (Div. II, 2005) Nov. '05 LED:13 (Privacy protection under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution extended to unfenced back yard area of two-acre parcel, where homeowner had posted “private property” and “no trespassing” signs alongside the roadway approaching his home, and the officer entered the backyard area around midnight dressed in camouflage)

State v. Jessen, 142 Wn. App. 852 (Div. III, 2008) March '08 LED:12 (Where 1) the entrance to Jessen’s driveway was posted with “no trespassing” and “keep out” signs, 2) the entrance had a closed (though unlocked) gate, 3) the property was in a remote area, and 4) Jessen’s secluded home could not be seen from the

driveway entrance or from any neighboring properties, the home was not “impliedly open to the public” for purposes of article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, and hence an officer could not lawfully approach the home in midday to talk to the resident as a possible witness to a theft)

4. *Aerial over-flight*

State v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578 (Div. III, 1999) Jan. '00 LED:07 (Naked-eye observation from airplane at lawful elevation of 500 feet of marijuana grow in roofless shed did not violate state constitutional privacy rights of property owner; officers' observations gave them probable cause that supported issuance of a search warrant)

5. *Open-to-the-public areas of business premises*

Dodge City Saloon v. Liquor Control Board, 168 Wn. App. 388 (Div. II, May 15, 2012) September '12 LED:13 (Dodge City Saloon has no reasonable privacy interest in areas of its licensed premises that it actively invites the public to enter)

6. *Trespassing or rules-violating “camper” on public land*

U.S. v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2000) Aug. '00 LED:03 (9th Circuit holds that camper trespassing on federal BLM land had a privacy interest in his makeshift abode in cave; case law in Washington and elsewhere is mixed on the question of the arguable privacy interest of a trespasser in his or her tent, “Hovertown” shack, cave, cardboard abode, or other makeshift home)

State v. Pippin, 200 Wn. App. 826 (Div. II, October 10, 2017) (Under Washington state constitution, article I, section 7, homeless person had a home-like right to privacy while he was inside a completely enclosed, tent-like structure that was completely covered by an opaque tarp; this right existed despite the fact that he was unlawfully located during daytime hours on public land located between a public road's guardrail and a chain link fence on private property.)

7. *Second look at items in jail property box*

State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626 (2003) Feb. '04 LED:05 (No search warrant was needed for police to take a “second look” in the jail property room at the soles of shoes that had been taken from an arrestee at the time of booking)

8. *Storage unit privacy*

State v. Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250 (2000) June '00 LED:14 (While a storage unit renter generally has a right of privacy as to items in unit, naked-eye observation by officers, without a flashlight, through a pre-existing hole in the storage unit wall into neighboring storage unit was not a search)

9. Toilet stall privacy

Tukwila v. Nalder, 53 Wn. App. 746 (Div. I, 1989) Sept. '89 LED:17 (Holds it a privacy invasion for officer to peer over toilet stall door on a hunch that its single occupant was engaged in masturbation); Compare State v. White, 129 Wn.2d 105 (1996) July '96 LED:15 (Holding that toilet stall in which fleeing suspect was hiding is not a protected private area for purposes of Payton v. New York rule restricting entry of private premises to make warrantless arrest)

10. Using a flashlight or binoculars is not a “search” under ordinary circumstances, but there are limits

State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388 (1996) March '96 LED:02 (Taking flashlight onto front porch and shining it into uncurtained window accessible from porch not a search)

State v. , 33 Wn. App. 275 (Div. I, 1982) Feb. '83 LED:13 (Officers OK in watching parking lot cocaine use activity through binoculars – it is OK to use binoculars to observe activity that could be lawfully observed with naked eye but for need to maintain cover)

11. Manipulating soft luggage may be a “search”

Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000) June '00 LED:12 (Manipulating soft luggage taken from overhead rack during bus sweep held to be “search”)

12. Warrant needed to get telephone long distance records and unlisted phone subscriber information under Washington constitution (presumably, similar privacy protection is extended to records of bank customers where the bank is not a victim of the customer, though there is no Washington case on point; Fourth Amendment does not extend privacy protection to bank records)

State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 (1986) Aug. '86 LED:04 (Long distance toll call records); State v. Butterworth, 48 Wn. App. 152 (Div. I, 1987) Aug. '87 LED:19 (unlisted subscriber information)

13. Warrant needed to search garbage cans under Washington constitution

State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571 (1990) Jan. '91 LED:02; State v. Sweeney, 125 Wn. App. 881 (Div. III, 2005) April '05 LED:15 (Boland and Sweeney involved garbage can searches at single-family residences) [NOTE: communal dumpsters, however, do not generally get same privacy protection – see State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409 (Div. III, 1992) Oct. '92 LED:06]

14. Warrant needed to use thermal detection device on residence under Washington constitution

State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173 (1994) April '94 LED:02 (Warrant required for use of thermal detection device on residence); see also Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001) Aug. '01 LED:07 (Fourth Amendment also bars warrantless use of thermal detection device on residence)

15. *Using a drug-sniffing dog to check a package in transit is not deemed a search of the package, but using a drug-sniffing dog at a residence or to sniff people apparently requires a search warrant under the Washington constitution, article I, section 7*

State v. Dearman, 92 Wn. App. 630 (Div. I, 1998) Nov. '98 LED:06 (Holding that use of drug-sniffing dog at residence required search warrant; distinguishing and not disapproving prior decisions involving dog sniffs of packages in transit, including State v. Gross, 57 Wn. App. 549 (1990) involving a warrantless dog sniff of a Federal Express package).

B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999) Dec. '99 LED:12 (Using drug-dog to randomly sniff students at high school violates Fourth Amendment)

Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005) March '05 LED:03, April '05 LED:02 (United States Supreme Court rules that using dog outside stopped car did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but U.S. Supreme Court was focused on “seizure” issue not on “search/privacy” issue; a different ruling might be made under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, either on seizure or search rationale, but there are as yet no Washington appellate court decisions directly on point)

16. *Checking DOL and WACIC records is not a “search”*

State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20 (2002) Jan. '03 LED:05 (Random checking of license plates against DOL database and then checking that information against WACIC database does not violate privacy rights of citizens under article I, section 7 of WA constitution)

17. *Abandoned property is not protected*

“Abandonment” for search and seizure purposes is different from abandonment under property law. Leaving/discarding an item in a public area (e.g., in the bushes in the park) with subjective intent to return and retrieve the item may not be abandonment of one’s property interest in the item, but it may be abandonment for search and seizure purposes because it is abandonment of any reasonable expectation of privacy as against members of the public or the police discovering and seizing the item. See discussion in LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, section 2.6 (4th Ed., 2004)

State v. Whitaker, 58 Wn. App. 851 (Div. I, 1990) Nov. '90 LED:07 (Suspect’s tossing of illegal drugs as officers approached held to be abandonment of the drugs where no police misconduct caused the tossing)

State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162 (Div. II, 1995) May '96 LED:05 (Purse left in store not “abandoned” because owner did not discard it, but OK under “community caretaking function” for police to look for ID to help find owner); State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402 (2007) March '07 LED:15 (Locked briefcase that was in the suspect’s pickup truck cab was not “abandoned” where the truck was parked in the suspect’s driveway, police lacked independent authority to search the truck or briefcase, the suspect denied ownership of the briefcase (denial of ownership of an item does not alone establish abandonment where item is in a protected private area), and he said that he could not consent to a seizure or search of the briefcase)

State v. Samalia, 186 Wn.2d 262 (July 28, 2016) July '16 LED:04 (Vehicle thief lost privacy right in his cell phone that he left behind in stolen vehicle when he ran from police after vehicle stop; Washington Supreme Court does not address theories regarding exigent circumstances, community caretaking, or attenuation exception to exclusionary rule because theories were not raised at trial court level)

18. *“Day visitor” to home is not protected by Fourth Amendment, but Washington officers beware*

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) Feb. '99 LED:04 (Coke dealers making consenting two-hour use of home to process product were not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection – NOTE: Washington appellate courts would probably find privacy protection under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution for such consensual visitors); State v. Link, 136 Wn. App. 685 (Div. II, 2007) March '07 LED:18 (Man who occasionally slept over at woman’s house, had a key, and kept some personal effects there, had right of privacy in those premises under Fourth Amendment)

19. *Installing and tracking GPS system in suspect’s car requires search warrant*

State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 521 (2003) Nov. '03 LED:02 (In case in which officers *did* obtain a search warrant to install and track a global position system (GPS) tracking device, the Washington Supreme Court holds in an “independent grounds” interpretation of article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution that a search warrant is required for such law enforcement intrusion; the Court upheld the warrant in this case, ruling that probable cause supported the search warrant.) (Note that in U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) March '12 LED:07, in a trespass-based ruling that is less broad than the Washington Supreme Court’s constitutional ruling in Jackson, the U.S. Supreme Court placed some limits under the Fourth Amendment on law enforcement activity related to attaching GPS devices on suspects’ vehicles and tracking the vehicles in those circumstances)

20. *Checking motel guest register with consent of motel/hotel operator does not require a search warrant, but officers must have an objective individualized basis for requesting access; if motel/hotel operator does not consent, law enforcement must obtain a subpoena or a search warrant unless exigent circumstances are present*

State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121 (2007) July '07 LED:21 (Random check held prohibited under article I, section 7 of Washington constitution), In re Personal Restraint of Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370 (2011) June '11 LED:21 (Officers held to have reasonable individualized suspicion of criminal activity (drug dealing) by a motel guest in his room, and therefore the officers were justified in requesting motel register information from motel staff)

Also note that in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S.Ct. 2443 (June 22, 2015), the United States Supreme Court declared to be unconstitutional a Los Angeles ordinance making it a misdemeanor for a hotel/motel operator to deny police random access to guest register information.

21. *Employee's employer-provided work computer at office*

U.S. v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) March '07 LED:13 (Because this child porn defendant had a lock and key for his office, and he had a personal password for his workplace computer, this worker for a private employer had a privacy right in his workplace computer against warrantless governmental search. However, his employer could and did lawfully consent to a government search where the employer: 1) owned the computer, 2) had a prohibition against certain kinds of usage, and 3) communicated to employees and carried out a policy and practice of routinely monitoring computer use and internet use)

City of Ontario, Calif. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) Aug. '10 LED:02 (Police employer's warrantless review of officer's pager transcript held reasonable as a non-investigatory, work-related search; Supreme Court avoids more difficult technology-privacy-search questions)

22. *Rental car privacy for person who borrows car from contractual lessee*

Fourth Amendment generally provides privacy protection for person driving rental car with permission of contractual renter of car, even if the rental agreement does not cover the driver. Byrd v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1518 (May 14, 2018)

23. *Cell-site location information privacy*

Cell-site location information (CSLI), at least where such information relates to extended period of time, is generally constitutionally protected. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (June 22, 2018). A search warrant, not a subpoena, is constitutionally required for obtaining historical cell-site location information in non-exigent circumstances. State v. Phillip, 6 Wn. App. 2d 651 (Div. I, August 5, 2019)

24. *Pinging is a search*

Warrantless ping of a cell phone in order to locate and arrest a murder suspect: Seven of the nine Washington Supreme Court justices conclude that real-time ping is a “search” under both the Washington and federal constitutions; six justices conclude that warrantless ping was lawful, either because exigent circumstances supported the ping (at least four justices, maybe six, agree) or because the legal conclusion that a “search” occurred is wrong (two justices agree). Beware, however, of RCW 9.73.260 (not addressed in the Muhammad case) requiring prosecutor approval for such ping. State v. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d 577 (November 7, 2019) – November 19:08

25. *Administrative subpoenas*

State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236 (2007) Nov. '07 LED:07 (Use by State Department of Financial Institutions of statutorily authorized administrative subpoena to obtain subject's bank records violates Washington constitution; Washington Legislature lacks the constitutional authority to grant subpoena power to executive branch agencies)

26. *Inserting a car key in a car's door lock*

Officer's investigatory act of insertion of a car key in a car's door lock was a search under the Fourth Amendment and subject to the warrant/exceptions requirement, because the officer physically occupied or intruded upon private property with the purpose of obtaining information to support an investigation. United States v. Dixon, 984 F.3d 814 (9th Cir., December 31, 2020)

B. *Search With A Warrant – Select Cases On Writing And Executing*

For more thorough treatment of this and other topics, see on CJTC Internet LED page “Confessions, Search, Seizure and Arrest: Guide for Police Officers and Prosecutors” by Pamela B. Loginsky, Staff Attorney, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

1. *Officer misstatements in the affidavit (reckless or worse)*

Chism v. Washington, 655 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2011) Jan. '12 LED:16 (Affidavit by law enforcement in child porn investigation involving computer search allegedly contained reckless material omissions and inaccurate statements)

2. *Frisking during warrant execution*

State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289 (1982) Feb. '83 LED:02 (“Presence plus” rule: individualized articulable reason for frisking those present needed even in narcotics warrant execution); State v. Lennon, 94 Wn. App. 573 (Div. III, 1999) May '99 LED:04 (No justification to frisk non-occupant visitor who came to front door during execution)

3. *Other execution concerns, including knock-and-announce requirement*

Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (Feb. 19, 2013) May '13 LED:03 (Fourth Amendment authority under Michigan v. Summers to seize residence occupants who are found in immediate vicinity of premises when execution of search warrant begins does not authorize seizing them if they have left the immediate vicinity before execution of search warrant begins; two blocks away was ruled not “immediate vicinity.”)

U.S. v. Ramirez, 976 F.3d 946 (9th Cir., September 25, 2020) (In a Fourth Amendment ruling in a criminal case, a 2-1 majority of a Ninth Circuit panel condemns a fake-home-burglary-investigation ruse by FBI agents who were executing a child pornography search warrant where: (1) the agents lied to their suspect in order to lure him home from work and (2) thus make him subject to seizure in his home under U.S. Supreme Court precedent of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)).

Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178 (March 2, 2016) March '16 LED:01 (Officers must knock and re-announce their presence and purpose when they know or reasonably should know that a shack or other structure within the curtilage of a home is a separate residence from the main house)

State v. Ortiz, 196 Wn. App. 301 (Div. III, October 13, 2016) – October '16 LED:06 (Knock and announce requirement not met; at 6:47 a.m., absent noise from inside home or other evidence to the contrary, residents could be expected to be asleep, so 6 to 9 second wait prior to forced entry was not an adequate wait)

4. *Boilerplate problems (“all vehicles”; “all persons”)*

State v. Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519 (Div. II, 1995) April '95 LED:05 (Boilerplate to search “all vehicles present” overbroad); State v. Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154 (Div. II, 1995) Nov. '95 LED:10 (Boilerplate to search “all persons present” overbroad)

5. *Probable cause; Plus staleness concerns*

State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133 (1999) Aug. '99 LED:15 (Officer-affiant’s experience-and-training statement re drug dealers’ habits, alone, won’t establish link of drug-dealing to a suspect’s home); State v. Keodara, 191 Wn. App. 305 (Div. I, Dec. 7, 2015) No LED entry (Officer-affiant’s experience-and-training statement re gang members’ habits, alone, won’t establish PC to search cell phone of gang member murder suspect)

5-4 majority of Washington Supreme Court rejects Thein-based challenge to probable cause support for search warrant for cell phone records, including cell site location information. The Majority Opinion identifies probable cause in the affidavit’s (1) description of defendant’s use of cell phones shortly before and shortly after a jewelry store burglary, and (2) strong evidence – including post-burglary fencing activity and the wearing of an unusual jewelry item matching a

stolen item – that defendant was the burglar. State v. Denham, 197 Wn.2d 759 (July 1, 2021). See the comments regarding Denham at page 72 of this Outline.

State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499 (2004) Dec. '04 LED:18 (If officers learn new information bearing on PC between time of issuance of warrant and time of execution, warrant is valid without further pre-execution review or authorization from the issuing court so long as the new information does not completely negate the existence of probable cause to search)

State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 354 (2012) June '12 LED:13 (Affidavit failed to establish point in time when CI observed marijuana grow in target premises)

Canine-based probable cause: U.S. Supreme Court holds that results of a drug-dog's field work are not mandatory for determining probable cause to search under Fourth Amendment; totality of circumstances must always be considered. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 1050 (Feb. 19, 2013) May '13 LED:07

C. Warrantless Entry Of Private Premises To Arrest

1. Arrestee's own residence (Payton v. New York rule)

Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573 (1980) June '80 LED:01 (In the absence of exigent circumstances, fresh pursuit, or a search warrant, officers seeking to make a forcible (non-consenting) entry to arrest a person from his or her residence must have: (1) an arrest warrant + (2) reason to believe the prospective arrestee is at home)

U.S. v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2002) March '03 LED:10 (The Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals held that the "reason to believe" test of Payton is a "probable cause" standard)

State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426 (1985) April '85 LED:11. (Ordering the person to come out of the house or reaching through the threshold to grab the prospective arrestee is the equivalent of a forced entry of the residence. Knocking at the door and requesting either voluntary consent to entry or voluntary exit by resident is permitted, but it is a legally risky tactic, because the person at the door can simply refuse consent.

Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009) April '09 LED:04 (In March of 2009, a 6-5 majority of an 11-judge panel reversed an earlier 3-judge ruling and held that no arrest warrant or search warrant is required in a barricaded-person situation during the time that officers are attempting to deal with the situation; exigency is deemed to exist throughout the process, and therefore ordering the person out or going in and getting the barricaded person is not subject to the Payton rule.)

State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390 (2007) Oct. '07 LED:06 (Payton rule applies under Washington constitution for entry to arrest the subjects of misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor warrants, but the Washington rule is not entirely consistent with the federal constitution's Fourth Amendment Payton rule in this context. The Hatchie

Court makes two significant rulings: 1) a misdemeanor arrest warrant justifies forcible entry of a person's own premises to arrest if officers have PC to believe the arrestee is present at the time of entry, but the Washington courts: a) will require that the subject of the warrant was actually home at the time of the entry (but see the LED editorial comments regarding Hatchie in which it is suggested that the Court may not have meant to establish an actual-presence requirement); b) will review to see if the entry to arrest was pretextual; and c) will review the time and manner of the entry to determine reasonableness. Also, the Hatchie Court concludes that the address listed on the arrest warrant does not control in determining what residence constitutes the arrestee's present residence – what controls is the information, i.e., probable cause, that officers have at the time of entry concerning the arrestee's current place of residence)

2. *Third party's residence (Steagald v. U.S. rule)*

Steagald v. U.S., 451 U.S. 204 (1981) May-Aug. '81 LED:01 (In the absence of exigent circumstances or fresh pursuit, officers seeking to make a forcible (non-consenting) entry to arrest a person from a third party's residence must have a search warrant)

3. *Hot pursuit of misdemeanor offender into residence*

In this criminal case, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the per se exigent circumstances rule for hot pursuit of fleeing felons that was recognized in the 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Santana does not support a per se exigency rationale for warrantless entry in hot pursuit of misdemeanor violators; additional factual justification – beyond the mere fact of hot pursuit – is needed in order to establish exigency in hot pursuits of fleeing misdemeanants. Lange v. California, 141 S.Ct. 2011 (June 23, 2021)

If an officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed DUI, or another serious crime with alcohol influence as an element of the crime, and the person tries to flee into a home, the officer apparently has the authority to forcibly enter the home and make an arrest. State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35 (Div. III, 1991) Sept. '91 LED:18 (Noting the special exigency of likely lost evidence – i.e., dissipation of alcohol – if officer has probable cause to arrest for DUI, not some more minor offense, before suspect flees into residence). See also State v. Wolters, 133 Wn. App. 297 (Div. II, 2006) July '06 LED:17 (Holding that where officer had PC to arrest a DUI suspect who would not take his hands out of his pockets, and who then fled into his home, under all of the circumstances the officer was justified in making forcible warrantless residential entry to arrest the DUI suspect).

But see State v. Hinshaw, 149 Wn. App. 747 (Div. III, 2009) July '09 LED:21 (holding in a case not involving hot pursuit, that PC as to a DUI committed within the past hour, plus the fact that alcohol dissipates in the body, did not add up to exigent circumstances such as to justify officer's reaching through open doorway to arrest man); see also Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009) May '11 LED:06 (in

another case not involving hot pursuit, officers held not justified in entry of residence based on their speculation that witness statement that suspect smelled of alcohol supported a conclusion that the resident may be near a diabetic coma).

Attorneys researching Washington case law in this area will want to look at the decisions in Seattle v. Altshuler, 53 Wn. App. 317 (Div. I, 1989) (Altshuler I, a criminal case opinion) and Altshuler v. Seattle, 63 Wn. App. 389 (Div. I, 1991) (Altshuler II, a civil case opinion that suggests that Altshuler I's criminal case opinion may have been too restrictive regarding hot pursuit issue). It appears that the June 23, 2021 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lange v. California, noted above in this section, supports the ruling by the Court of Appeals in Altshuler I against hot pursuit entry where there was arguable hot pursuit but no exigent circumstances.

See also State v. Bessette, 105 Wn. App. 793 (Div. III, 2001) Aug. '01 LED:14 (Holds that officer in hot pursuit of MIP suspect did not have exigent circumstances justifying non-consenting, warrantless entry of third party's residence to arrest suspect)

D. Warrantless Search Of Vehicle Passenger Area Incident To Arrest

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009) June '09 LED:13, the U.S. Supreme Court revised its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and significantly restricted the authority of officers to conduct warrantless searches of the passenger areas of motor vehicles incident to arrests of occupants. The Gant Court noted that the rationale of allowing search incident to arrest is to prevent a suspect from obtaining a weapon and preserving possible evidence that a suspect might access and destroy or compromise. The Gant Court concluded that where an arrestee has been fully secured in handcuffs in the back seat of a locked patrol car, these rationales do not support allowing a search of the vehicle incident to arrest (though Gant did allow a Fourth Amendment exception in the circumstance where officers search the vehicle's passenger compartment based on reason to believe it contains evidence of the crime of arrest).

The June 2009 LED reported that there would be uncertainty for the foreseeable future regarding some aspects of the new Fourth Amendment rule. The LED then gave a best guess regarding the new basic Fourth Amendment rule for a warrantless motor vehicle search incident to arrest in light of Gant and in light of prior Washington appellate court decisions interpreting article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution. Within the next year or so after Gant was issued, the Washington Supreme Court issued three separate opinions addressing the question of whether the Washington constitution imposes greater restrictions than the Fourth Amendment on the trigger to conducting vehicle searches incident to arrest (the greater restriction of the Washington constitution would reject the Fourth Amendment exception for the circumstance where officers search for evidence related to the crime of arrest).

Those Washington Supreme Court decisions were State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379 (2009) Dec. '09 LED:17; State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761 (2009) Feb. '10 LED:11; and State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169 (2010) Aug '10 LED:10. The lead opinions in those three cases were not written as clearly or consistently as they might have been, and the cases did not involve facts that necessarily would lead to a definitive holding interpreting article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution as constricting authority of Washington officers to conduct searches incident to arrest even further than does the Fourth Amendment under Gant. But it appeared to most legal commentators that a majority of the Washington Supreme Court justices were endorsing in the three cases a more restrictive Washington constitutional rule that would not allow.

In its decision issued April 5, 2012 in State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177 (2012) May '12 LED:25, the Washington Supreme Court cleared up the confusion created by its three decisions in Patton, Valdez and Afana. The Snapp Court clearly created a more restrictive rule under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution than the U.S. Supreme Court created under the Fourth Amendment in Gant.

Using “strikeout” for deletions of Gant-authority language and underlining for new language of the Washington rule under Snapp to show how the Snapp decision has shrunk Washington officers’ authority even further than Gant did under the Fourth Amendment, the Washington rule is as follows:

After officers have made a custodial arrest of a motor vehicle occupant – including searching the arrestee’s person – and have secured the arrestee in handcuffs in a patrol car, and while the vehicle is still at the scene of the arrest, they may automatically search the vehicle – without a search warrant, without actual exigent circumstances, and without need for justification under any other exception to the search warrant requirement – NEVER.

~~in the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any unlocked containers in that compartment if and only if A) they proceed without unreasonable delay; and B) they have a reasonable belief that the passenger compartment contains evidence of: 1) the crime(s) for which the officers originally decided to make an arrest, or (2) any other crime(s) for which the officers have developed probable cause to arrest before beginning the search of the passenger compartment.~~

It is probably no consolation to any current Washington law enforcement officers, but the Snapp Court’s “independent grounds” ruling regarding MV search incident under article I, section 7 in Snapp had been seen before in Washington. Essentially the same “independent grounds” rule was created by the Washington Supreme Court almost 30 years earlier in State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686 (1983). That search incident ruling in Ringer (along with the Court’s “independent grounds” elimination of the PC-car-search rule of the “Carroll Doctrine”) brought

an immediate hue and cry from many Washingtonians who saw Ringer as undermining law and order. Included in the response was an unsuccessful initiative campaign involving the combined efforts of the AGO, prosecutors and law enforcement interests seeking to amend the Washington constitution to prevent any further personal-values-driven “independent grounds” rulings (the campaign was inspired by similar constitutional amendment campaigns that have succeeded long-term in limiting “independent grounds” rulings in California and Florida).

While the initiative campaign that was sparked by Ringer did not, unfortunately, succeed, the campaign may have gained the attention of the Washington Supreme Court. Less than three years after deciding Ringer, the Washington Supreme Court reverted back to essentially its pre-Ringer MV search incident rule in State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 (1986) (though not then or thereafter did the Supreme Court restore the PC-car-search rule of the “Carroll Doctrine.” And now in Snapp the Court has overturned Stroud). There has been no initiative campaign this time around.

Under the Washington constitution as interpreted in Snapp, there is essentially no authority to search a vehicle incident to arrest once officers have fully secured the arrestee-occupant in handcuffs in a patrol car, so much of the remainder of this subsection II.D. is largely only of historical interest to officers whose searches are reviewed under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution. Nonetheless, we have only revised this section II.D. of the outline (1) to delete or revise material that is inconsistent with Snapp and Gant, but (2) to retain material that is not squarely inconsistent with Snapp and Gant. The court decisions that we cite and describe, of course, must be read with Snapp and Gant in mind.

1. *There must first be an “arrest”*

State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564 (2003) April ’03 LED:03 (Under article I, section 7 of Washington constitution, the search may not precede the arrest in order for the search to be deemed “incident to arrest” – Officers must do the arrest formally “by the numbers” before they search the vehicle or person under search incident authority)

State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43 (Div. III, 2004) March ’04 LED:11 (Putting suspended driver in back seat of patrol car and telling him he is under arrest held not a “custodial arrest” for “search incident” purposes where he was not frisked, searched, or handcuffed, and he was allowed to use cell phone while sitting in the patrol car)

2. *Crimes for which search incident of vehicle or of a person or of the person’s effects is permitted*

State v. Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d 517 (2005) Aug ’05 LED:09 (Washington Supreme Court holds that in those circumstances where an officer has discretion whether to make a custodial arrest – or instead to cite and release – as a standard practice, the officer may

make the custodial arrest, conduct a search incident to that arrest, and, after completing the search, exercise discretion whether to cite and release the detainee or instead to take the detainee in for booking. Note, however, that the Washington Supreme Court did not address whether a more restrictive rule is required under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, nor was there a constitutional pretext issue presented in the Pulfrey case.) Consider also the discussion of searches incident to what some call “non-booking arrests” in the March 2003 LED article (pages 2-6) titled: “Custodial arrest and search incident to arrest of those arrested for driving while license suspended.”

State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685 (1992) Dec. '92 LED:17 (Declares that custodial arrest OK for all of the traffic crimes which are listed in RCW 10.31.100(3) -- *but* beware of State v. Nelson, 81 Wn. App. 249 (Div. II, 1996) Sept. '96 LED:06 (indicating limits to Reding rule though upholding negligent driving arrest under former (criminal) negligent driving RCW) But see Gant-Snapp limits on the threshold question of authority to do MV search-incident in the first place.

State v. McKenna, 91 Wn. App. 554 (Div. II, 1998) Oct. '98 LED:05 (If officer clearly manifests at the time intent not to make a custodial arrest, then no authority to “search incident”)

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) Feb. '99 LED:02 (Search held invalid under Fourth Amendment by U.S. Supreme Court where Iowa statute permitted “search incident to traffic citation”)

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) July '01 LED:18 (U.S. Supreme Court rules that the Fourth Amendment allows custodial arrest for all misdemeanors, even those punishable only by a fine; Washington constitution probably does not authorize arrest for fine-only misdemeanors, to the extent there may be such statutes or ordinances in Washington) But see Snapp and Gant limits on the threshold question of authority to do MV search-incident in the first place.

State v. O'Neill, 110 Wn. App. 604 (Div. III, 2002) June '02 LED:21 (Court upholds custodial arrest and “search incident” even though officer did not comply with local policy that required checking with jail before arresting on the particular type of offense); **State v. Gering, 146 Wn. App. 935 (Div. III, 2008) Jan. '10 LED:09 (Court upholds custodial arrest and “search incident,” rejecting defendant’s argument that custodial arrest should not be permitted on arrest for offense for which jail would not have taken him)**

3. *Search of vehicle following arrest of passenger, not driver (this subsection generally has relevance only to searches governed by the Fourth Amendment in light of Gant’s exception allowing a Fourth Amendment exception in the circumstance where officers search the vehicle’s passenger compartment based on reason to believe it contains evidence of the crime of arrest).*

State v. Cass, 62 Wn. App. 793 (Div. II, 1991) Jan. '92 LED:06 (Arrest of passenger on warrant justified search of passenger area of vehicle incident to that arrest); State v. Bello, 142 Wn. App. 930 (Div. I, 2008) March '08 LED:07 (same as Cass) (Gant likely would not allow a search incident to arrest where the arrest is on a warrant)

4. *Timing of vehicle search (this subsection generally has relevance only to searches governed by the Fourth Amendment in light of Gant's exception allowing a Fourth Amendment exception in the circumstance where officers search the vehicle's passenger compartment based on reason to believe it contains evidence of the crime of arrest).*

State v. Boyce, 52 Wn. App. 274 (Div. I, 1988) Nov. '88 LED:02 (Vehicle search not incident to arrest if made after the arrestee has been taken away from the scene)

U.S. v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987) (30- to 45-minute delay before searching arrestee's vehicle was too long; search was no longer "incident to" the arrest)

State v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) March '06 LED:02 (Search ruled to have occurred close enough in time to the time of arrest to be deemed "incident to arrest" even though, for safety reasons, the officers waited 10 to 15 minutes for a third officer to arrive before conducting the car search)

State v. Boursaw, 94 Wn. App. 627 (Div. I, 1999) May '99 LED:07 (After officer found likely drug paraphernalia in initial check of passenger area, delay of completion of search for 10 minutes waiting for drug-sniffing K-9 to arrive was OK). But see State v. Valdez, 137 Wn. App. 280 (Div. II, 2007) April '07 LED:08, affirmed on other grounds by Washington Supreme Court in State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761 (2009) Feb. '10 LED:11 (K-9 search of passenger area of vehicle held by Court of Appeals to be an impermissible second "search incident" of the vehicle following the arrest of occupants. Officers first secured the arrestee in patrol car, then did a quick search of the arrestee's car. After seeing a few missing screws and some loose paneling, officer called for a drug-sniffing K-9, which was brought to the scene fairly quickly. The dog sniffed out drugs that were behind the loose paneling. It is difficult to logically distinguish this decision from Division One's decision in Boursaw). We think that Boursaw was the correctly decided case on this delayed-search issue. As noted at the outset of this section of the outline, the Washington Supreme Court granted review in Valdez, but then decided the case on different grounds (i.e., determining that there was no threshold authority to search the vehicle incident to arrest after the arrestee had been secured in a patrol car).

5. *Required link between arrestee and MV and vehicle (this subsection generally has relevance only to searches governed by the Fourth Amendment in light of Gant's exception allowing a Fourth Amendment exception in the circumstance where officers search the vehicle's passenger compartment based on reason to believe it contains evidence of the crime of arrest).*

State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339 (Div. I, 1989) March '90 LED:05 (MV was subject to Stroud search where arrestee used car to commit crime moments earlier, and he was near the unlocked vehicle when the arrest for selling marijuana from car was made)

State v. O'Neill, 110 Wn. App. 604 (Div. III, 2002) June '02 LED:21 (Where officer announced that driver was under arrest before the driver got out of the truck, the driver's act of locking the truck as he got out did not make the truck's passenger area off-limits to a warrantless "search incident")

State v. Perea, 85 Wn. App. 339 (Div. II, 1997) June '97 LED:02 (Where suspect parked, got out of vehicle and locked it before a seizure was made, the vehicle was not subject to a "search incident" under the Stroud rule)

State v. Quinlivan, 142 Wn. App. 960 (Div. III, 2008) March '08 LED:02 (Where, after being seized but before being told he was under arrest, driver got out of vehicle and locked it, vehicle was not subject to search incident)

State v. Porter, 102 Wn. App. 327 (Div. I, 2000) Nov. '00 LED:05 (MV not subject to Stroud search where arrest on warrant was made 300 feet from the vehicle, and the vehicle was not linked to the basis for the arrest)

State v. Wheless, 103 Wn. App. 749 (Div. I, 2000) March '01 LED:04 (Holding MV "search incident" not permitted where arrest made in tavern bathroom, even though, during "buy-bust" operation suspect had only moments earlier gone into his vehicle in the tavern parking lot 50-75 away)

State v. Johnston, 107 Wn. App. 280 (Div. II, 2001) Oct. '01 LED:19 (Vehicle search was not "incident to arrest" even though the arrest took place in the vicinity of the vehicle, because the arrestee had no ready access to the vehicle or immediate control of the vehicle at the time of the arrest)

State v. Rathbun, 124 Wn. App. 372 (Div. II, 2004) Jan. '05 LED:08 (Vehicle search could not be upheld under "incident to arrest" rationale because arrest process began over 40 feet from the vehicle, even though suspect had been standing near his vehicle when officers began to drive up his driveway to make contact with him)

Thornton v. U.S., 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004) July '04 LED:02 (Under the Fourth Amendment, the arrestee's prior suspicious activity after he had spotted the officer while driving, and his physical location relatively near his car at the time of his later arrest were sufficient linkage in terms of time, space and behavioral link to his car to justify a warrantless searching of his car incident to his arrest for possession of illegal drugs, despite the fact that the officer's first contact with the suspect occurred after the suspect had gotten out of his car and had shut, but not locked, the door)

6. *Scope of the vehicle search – "bright line" rule (this subsection generally has relevance only to searches governed by the Fourth Amendment in light of Gant's*

exception allowing a Fourth Amendment exception in the circumstance where officers search the vehicle's passenger compartment based on reason to believe it contains evidence of the crime of arrest).

State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 (1986) Aug. '86 LED:01 (MV search incident extends to passenger area and unlocked containers in that area)

State v. Mitzlaff, 80 Wn. App. 184 (Div. II, 1995) March '96 LED:11 (Engine compartment is not within scope of Stroud)

State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431 (1996) March '96 LED:06 (MV search of long-haul trucker's cab sleeping area is within scope of Stroud rule)

U.S. v. Mayo, 394 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2005) March '05 LED:07 (Hatchback area of vehicle is within scope of the Fourth Amendment rule)

State v. Parker, State v. Jines, State v. Hunnel, 139 Wn.2d 486 (1999) Dec. '99 LED:13 (Where arrest is made of less than all of the occupants of the vehicle, then the officer may not automatically search those personal effects that are left behind in the passenger area and which are known to belong to non-arrested person(s). Some question remains as to whether the standard limiting the search is "effects known to belong" or "effects reasonably believed to belong" to non-arrestees. Note, however, that in State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282 (2001) Oct. '01 LED:09, the Washington Supreme Court stated in dicta (language not necessary to support the decision) that "known to belong" is the standard under Parker.)

State v. Jackson, 107 Wn. App. 646 (Div. I, 2001) Oct. '01 LED:16 (Under Parker rule, officers may search personal effects for ID where the occupants give confusing information about the ownership of those personal effects)

State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328 (2002) July '02 LED:11 (Washington Supreme Court reverses Court of Appeals and rules that driver who kept his gun in his girl-friend's purse had "automatic standing" to raise a Parker objection to a police search of the purse following his arrest, and that the search was unlawful under Parker because the arresting officer knew the purse belonged to passenger and was not in control of arrestee-driver)

State v. Boursaw, 94 Wn. App. 629 (Div. I, 1999) May '99 LED:07 (Removal of ashtray OK – this is not an impermissible dismantling of the vehicle)

State v. Vrieling, 144 Wn.2d 489 (2001) Oct. '01 LED: 02 (Entire readily-accessible passenger area of a Winnebago was subject to Stroud "search incident" where an occupant was custodially arrested in the Winnebago following a traffic stop. Also, the Court of Appeals had earlier held in Vrieling, 97 Wn. App. 152 (Div. I, 1999) Nov. '99 LED:07, that a zipped seat cushion was not a "locked" container under Stroud, and therefore officers could lawfully unzip cushion and search it as part of a search incident.)

E. Warrantless Search Of Person And Personal Effects Incident To Arrest (No Vehicle Search)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177 (2012) May '12 LED:29 and Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009) June '09 LED:13, discussed above at the beginning of section II.D. addressed motor vehicle searches incident to arrest (Gant was decided under the Fourth Amendment, and Snapp was decided under the Washington constitution's article I, section 7). After Gant and Snapp were decided, it was thought by many that those decisions may be interpreted to also limit the authority to search personal effects incident to arrest by barring a search of containers or effects taken from the actual possession of the arrestee if the search were to occur after the arrestee has been secured in handcuffs in the back of a patrol car. The Washington Supreme Court rejected that idea in its interpretation of the Washington and federal constitutions in two decisions, one in 2013 and the second in 2014.

In State v. Byrd, 178 Wn.2d 611 (Oct. 10, 2013) December '13 LED:12, the Court determined to be lawful a contemporaneous warrantless search of a purse simply because the purse was in the actual possession of the arrestee at the time of the arrest, but the Court warned that Washington's constitution does not authorize search incident based merely on constructive possession of an item. The Court confirmed its Byrd ruling in State v. MacDicken, 179 Wn.2d 936 (February 27, 2014) April '14 LED:10 when the Court held that immediately after officers arrested and handcuffed a suspect in a parking lot, a bright line, time-of-arrest rule authorized the officers, incident to the arrest, to search a bag that was taken from his actual possession at the time of arrest. Under this bright line rule, the Court deemed it irrelevant whether the arrestee, who had not yet been fully secured by placement in a patrol car at the time of the search of the bag, could or could not have broken free and accessed the bag.

A dissenting opinion in State v. MacDicken argued that the majority opinion's bright-line rule in Byrd and MacDicken violates the Fourth Amendment and the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Gant in authorizing contemporaneous searches of items actually possessed at the time of arrest, even where an arrestee has been fully secured. We will need to wait and see how the U.S. Supreme Court deals with that question. Meanwhile, we provide immediately below the following comments that we have adapted with minor edits from the Law Enforcement Digest editor in the December LED regarding Byrd and the April 2014 LED regarding MacDicken (those LED editorial comments were still appropriate as of deadline of this outline):

ADAPTED LED EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON BYRD AND MACDICKEN:

1. **Is there a logical basis for the distinction between (A) items actually possessed and (B) items in the lunge area?**

The Byrd majority opinion relies on doctrinal history and does not offer logic for its line-drawing distinction between: (A) items actually possessed by the arrestee at or immediately preceding the point of arrest (under Byrd, such items are always contemporaneously searchable, even after fully securing the arrestee in handcuffs in a patrol car, under a “bright line” rule without need for any justification other than the mere fact of a custodial arrest); and (B) items located within the lunge area but only constructively, not actually, possessed by the arrestee at or immediately preceding the point of arrest (under Byrd, such items are not searchable unless there exists actual, fact-based exigency of preventing the arrestee’s access to weapons or destructible evidence).

The lack of a clear, logical underpinning for this distinction may be attacked by civil libertarian interests as well as law enforcement interests. The tug-of-war is never over. We expect that in future cases, one side will seek to shrink the search-incident authority granted to law enforcement by the Byrd majority, while the other side will seek to expand it. For now, it does not seem fruitful for Washington law enforcement officers to ponder the logic of the distinction between items actually possessed and those only constructively possessed. Officers must simply deal with the clear line drawn by the Byrd majority.

2. Does the Byrd decision affect the doctrine of car searches incident to arrest?

Byrd does not relax any of the restrictions on car searches incident to arrest in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) June '09 LED:13 or State v. Snapp, 172 Wn.2d 177 (2012) May '12 LED:25. In Byrd, the officer took the purse from the arrestee’s lap before she got out of the car. The Court deemed the purse to be in her possession at or immediately preceding the arrest. But we think that Byrd does not authorize officers who have secured an arrestee in handcuffs in a patrol car to retrieve from a vehicle an item that an occupant (1) actually possessed on or about his or her person immediately prior to arrest, and (2) left behind in the vehicle when getting out of the vehicle.

3. What is the nature and scope of the Byrd majority’s “immediately preceding” element of the authority to search items actually possessed immediately preceding or at the point of arrest?

The Byrd majority clearly states that its bright line rule extends to items possessed “immediately preceding” the point of arrest. We think that the Court was concerned that persons about to be arrested would anticipate the arrest and attempt to ditch an item before the officer begins the formal arrest process.

In some circumstances, a ditched item could be deemed unprotected from seizure and search restrictions because the item could, in any event, be deemed “abandoned” for purposes of search and seizure law (for instance, if the item were tossed into the bushes in a city park or onto a city street). But in some circumstances, ditching an item would not qualify as abandonment (for instance,

if the item were handed to a friend or tossed into the arrestee's car or pickup truck bed or onto his home's porch). We think officers should proceed cautiously with this actually-possessed-immediately-preceding-arrest element of the Byrd test. A merely ambiguous furtive gesture by a car's lone-occupant-driver as she pulls over in a traffic stop probably will not translate to a conclusion that her purse, sitting apart from her on the passenger seat when the officer arrives at the driver-side window, was on her lap at the point when the officer made the traffic stop that led to a warrant arrest.

Another question raised by the "immediately preceding" element of the Byrd majority's standard is the temporal meaning of "immediately." Does "immediately preceding" extend search incident authority to all situations where a stop eventually leads to an arrest. For instance, an officer stops a driver for slowly rolling through a stop sign. The officer contacts the driver and sees some signs of possible intoxication. The officer asks the driver to get out of the car to perform field sobriety tests. The driver takes her jacket and purse off her lap and places them on the front passenger seat of the vehicle. She then gets out of her car. She fails field sobriety testing, and the officer arrests her for DUI. Were the jacket and purse in her actual possession "immediately preceding" the point of arrest? This scenario seems distinguishable from the facts in Byrd because there the defendant apparently knew she was being arrested before she got out of the vehicle. Only future case decisions will tell us the answer to our scenario.

4. Is the law now settled on authority to contemporaneously search items in the lunge area of a handcuffed arrestee where the items were actually possessed at or immediately before the point of arrest?

The short answer is "Yes." As noted above, the Washington Supreme Court applied the bright line rule of Byrd to rule in MacDicken that, because the arrestee in MacDicken was, just prior to the arrest, in immediate possession of the item that officers contemporaneously searched incident to arrest, the search appears to be per se lawful. Note also that the Byrd majority opinion announced that the Court of Appeals correctly decided State v. Bonds, 174 Wn. App. 553 (Div. II, April 23, 2013) July 13 LED:15 (search of pocket of pants that arrestee was wearing while he stood in handcuffs held lawful). The Washington Supreme Court denied defendant Bonds' petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision. See also the Washington Supreme Court decision in State v. Brock, 184 Wn.2d 148 (Sept. 3, 2015).

But consider the troubling analysis by Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Alexander, 10 Wn. App. 2d 682 (Div. I, October 7, 2019). The express holding of the Court of Appeals in the 2019 Alexander opinion is that a backpack was not lawfully searched incident to arrest because, at or immediately preceding the point of arrest, although the backpack was in constructive possession of the arrestee, the backpack was not observed to be or reported to officers to have been in actual and exclusive possession of the arrestee. This fits

the Washington Supreme Court's standard in the above-noted decisions in Byrd, MacDicken and Brock. The troubling part of Alexander's legal analysis is additional language in the Opinion that appears to indicate that, even if the backpack had instead been on the person of the arrestee, suppression would have been justified because the arresting officer denied the arrestee's request to hand off her backpack to her nearby boyfriend. The Legal Update for Washington Law Enforcement editor contends that the additional language is dicta (discussion unnecessary to support the result) that is inconsistent with the Washington Supreme Court's bright line search incident rule as articulated in that Court's above-noted decisions in Byrd, MacDicken and Brock.

5. What about the arrestee's items that are located in the lunge area of a handcuffed arrestee where the items were not actually possessed at or immediately before the point of arrest?

On June 3, 2014, the Washington Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Ellison, 172 Wn. App. 710 (Div. II, Jan. 8, 2013) March '13 LED:17. In Ellison, the arrestee was sleeping or hiding under a blanket on a backyard patio area when officers responded to a resident's call about a prowler/stalker. The officers pulled back the blanket to reveal him and a backpack that was sitting between his legs.

Officers placed Ellison in handcuffs as they arrested him. Officers moved the bag a short distance away and then searched the bag with arrestee Ellison standing in handcuffs nearby. The analysis by the Court of Appeals in Ellison assumed, as had the Court of Appeals in its analysis in MacDicken (an assumption since rejected by the Washington Supreme Court with its bright line rule in Byrd and MacDicken and State v. Brock, 184 Wn.2d 148 (Sept. 3, 2015) that the State was required to prove that exigent circumstances existed. The Court of Appeals concluded in Ellison (as had the Court of Appeals in MacDicken) that exigent circumstances did exist even though Mr. Ellison was handcuffed when the search occurred. Handcuffs are not escape-proof nor are they otherwise an absolute protection from an arrestee getting at a weapon or destroying evidence, the Court held. The Washington Supreme Court had stayed action on the petition in Ellison pending its resolution of the MacDicken case. As noted above, on June 3, 2014, the Washington Supreme Court denied review in Ellison. The Supreme Court never explains why it denies review, so one can only speculate as to the reason for denial.

In light of the Byrd and MacDicken and Brock decisions and in light of the fact that the bag in question was between Ellison's legs at the time of arrest, there is a strong possibility that the Supreme Court panel that denied review in Ellison concluded that he was in "actual possession" of the backpack at the point of arrest. If so, then the contemporaneous search was lawful under the bright line time-of-arrest rule of Byrd and MacDicken. If not, then the lunge question addressed by the intermediate appellate courts in MacDicken and Ellison (and

avoided by the Washington Supreme Court in MacDicken) would be posed. We think that the Court of Appeals in MacDicken and Ellison correctly assessed the lunge-risk question. Handcuffing without securing an arrestee in a locked patrol car does not provide absolute protection against an arrestee gaining access to a weapon or destroying evidence. But we will have to wait for another case to come to the Washington Supreme Court to get a definitive answer on that question.

6. What about items that were not actually possessed at or immediately prior to arrest and are not searchable under an actual exigency theory after the arrestee has been fully secured in handcuffs in the back seat of a patrol car?

Law enforcement has long had to cope with the question of what to do with arrestee items that are in the surrounding area at the time of arrest but are not searchable under whatever may be the then-applicable, fluid doctrine of search incident to arrest. Whenever probable cause to search exists in such circumstances, securing the item and seeking a search warrant is the best course. In some cases, a consent search is an option. In some cases, an inventory rationale, if there is in fact an agency policy or established practice that is correctly followed, may justify inspecting a container or item before transporting it to a jail or an agency property room. The Washington Supreme Court's Byrd decision does not eliminate or help resolve the dilemma faced in such circumstances. But Byrd does narrow the circumstances in which the dilemma will be presented.

1. *There must first be an "arrest"*

State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564 (2003) April '03 LED:03 (Under article I, section 7 of Washington constitution, the search may not precede the arrest – do the arrest “by the numbers”)

State v. Salinas, 169 Wn. App. 210 (Div. I, July 2, 2012) October '12 LED:17 (Court holds that suspect was under arrest for purposes of O'Neill rule where, before searching his person, officers chased him down and ordered him to lie on the ground face down, officers then allowed a police dog to bite Salinas because he did not initially comply fully with the order, and officers then handcuffed him)
Note: The Washington Supreme Court denied Salinas's request for review.

2. *Crimes for which custodial arrest and hence search incident permitted*

Case law allows a custodial arrest for any crime except for certain traffic crimes. See discussion in Part II.D.2 above regarding traffic crime limitation on custodial arrest.

3. *Timing of the search*

State v. Clayton Donald Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675 (1992) Dec. '92 LED:04 (A delay of 10 to 15 minutes before the officer looked inside a fanny pack taken from arrestee did not invalidate the search where the delay was due to other activity of the officer relating to the arrest and investigation).

Aspects of Smith were called into question by Division Three of the Court of Appeals in State v. Byrd, 161 Wn. App. 612 (Div. III) Oct. '11 LED:21, Division Three suggesting that Arizona v. Gant's Fourth Amendment ruling is contrary to the reasoning and ruling in Smith. As noted above in this section, the Court of Appeals decision in Byrd was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court. But the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Byrd does not fully endorse all of the language of the majority opinion in Smith.

Note that in State v. Brock, 184 Wn.2d 148 (Sept. 3, 2015) Sept. '15 LED:06 , an 8-1 majority of the Washington Supreme Court held that a backpack taken from the person of a suspect at the beginning of a Terry stop automatically became subject to search incident to arrest under the "time of arrest" rule when the Terry stop ripened into a lawful arrest over a period of ten minutes. This Supreme Court decision reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Brock, 182 Wn. App. 680 (Div. I, Aug. 4, 2014) Oct '14 LED:22.

4. *Scope of the search (includes "lunge area" at point of arrest)*

The U.S. Supreme Court held in its 1969 Chimel decision that the scope of the search extends to all items on the person of and carried by the arrestee and all areas into which the arrestee might lunge to get a weapon or to destroy evidence. State v. Clayton Donald Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675 (1992) Dec. '92 LED:04 holds that a fanny pack being carried by the arrestee when the arrest process begins can be searched following handcuffing of the arrestee, even though at that point the fanny pack is lying on the ground outside the "lunge area". The location of items when the arrest process begins will justify a search of such items. **Again, aspects of Smith were called into question by Division Three of the Court of Appeals in State v. Byrd, 161 Wn. App. 612 (Div. III) Oct. '11 LED:21, Division Three suggesting that Arizona v. Gant's Fourth Amendment ruling is contrary to the reasoning and ruling in Smith. As noted above in this section, the Court of Appeals decision in Byrd was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court. But the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Byrd does not fully endorse all of the language of the majority opinion in Smith.**

While the case law allows for a thorough search of the person, as well his or her outer clothing, packages, and containers based on the mere fact of the arrest, the Court of Appeals has held in State v. Rulan C., 97 Wn. App. 884 (Div. I, 1999) May '99 LED:15 that a complete, cheek-spreading "strip search" at the scene of arrest in a home went beyond the permissible scope.

5. *"Bright line" nature of authority*

State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119 (Div. I, 1987) Dec. '87 LED:18 (Recognizes that the authority to search incident to arrest does not depend on fact-based probabilities that evidence or weapons will be found. The fact of the lawful arrest establishes the authority to search)

State v. Lowrimore, 67 Wn. App. 949 (Div. I, 1992) March '93 LED:15 (All containers are equally subject to “search incident”)

6. **“Booking search” limits if arrest made on bail warrant**

State v. Gloria Smith, 56 Wn. App. 145 (Div. III, 1989) March '90 LED:12 & Feb. '91 LED:18 (Must allow person arrested on bail warrant to post bail to avoid “booking” search of personal effects; *suggestion*: be sure to search the personal effects in the field in the “search incident to arrest”)

F. **Warrantless Search By Consent**

1. **First party consent**

a. **Voluntariness considerations, including consent request forms, threats to get a warrant, warnings re rights, and deception**

State v. Apodaca, 67 Wn. App. 736 (Div. III, 1992) March '93 LED:13 (Threat to “get warrant” may make consent involuntary; better to say “apply for”)

State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564 (2003) April '03 LED:03 (Consent not “voluntary” if given after officer asserts that “search incident” standard would justify a warrantless search anyway)

State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103 (1998) Oct. '98 LED:02 (Officers seeking consent in a knock-and-talk situation must give warnings advising occupant of the 3 R's of consent – right to refuse, right to restrict scope, and right to revoke – in order to obtain valid consent to search residence)

State v. Budd, 185 Wn.2d 566 (May 19, 2016) May '16 LED:09 (5-4 Washington Supreme Court majority (1) interprets trial court ruling as having found that officers failed to give full Ferrier warnings, orally or in writing, before entering a child porn suspect's home in conducting a “knock and talk” to seize a computer and search it off site, and (2) holds that giving full warnings immediately after entry of the home did not satisfy Ferrier requirement)

State v. Bustamonte-Davila, 138 Wn.2d 964 (1999) Nov. '99 LED: 02 (Ferrier rule does not apply to request for residential entry where officer's intent is to make arrest on INS order, not to search)

State v. Williams (Harlan M.), 142 Wn.2d 17 (2000) Dec. '00 LED:14 (Request to homeowner to search residence for a felon-guest wanted on an arrest warrant is not subject to the Ferrier rule)

State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn. App. 972 (Div. II, 2001) Nov. '01 LED:06 (Full Ferrier warnings were required for officers to obtain valid consent to enter a motel room where the officers had gone to investigate after receiving a report of illegal drug-dealing by persons in the motel room)

State v. Freepons, 147 Wn. App. 649 (Div. II, 2008) Feb. '09 LED:14 (Ferrier warnings were required to seek consent to search house for person believed to have left scene of rollover MV accident)

State v. Ruem, 179 Wn.2d 195 (Nov. 27, 2013) January '14 LED:15 (Ferrier warnings will help on voluntariness question but are not necessarily required in order to obtain voluntary consent from a resident to search that person's residence for a third party non-resident where that third party non-resident is wanted on an arrest warrant; note that voluntariness is assessed on the totality of the circumstances, and that factors in the totality analysis include whether warnings were given and how any warnings were worded)

State v. Westvang, 184 Wn. App. 1 (Div. II, Oct. 14, 2014) December '14 LED:06 (Law enforcement officers are not required to give the three Ferrier "knock and talk" consent warnings - - right to refuse, right to restrict scope and right to retract - - when the officers' manifested intent is to ask a resident for consent to look for an arrest warrant subject the officers believe is present in the residence)

State v. Witherrite, 184 Wn. App. 859 (Div. III, Dec. 9, 2014) January '15 LED:02 (Ferrier "knock and talk" warnings are not required to obtain single-party consent to search a vehicle, but the Court of Appeals suggested that giving such warnings whenever seeking consent is "best practice")

State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d 557 (2003) Aug. '03 LED:06 (Ferrier warnings were not required for officers to obtain valid consent from a suspect's grandmother for purposes of entry of the grandmother's home just to "talk to" her grandson who lived there and who was a suspect in a malicious mischief case; the majority opinion suggests, however, that if probable cause for a search had developed in this situation, the officers would have been required to obtain a search warrant rather than then obtaining consent to search)

State v. Tagas, 121 Wn. App. 872 (Div. I, 2004) July '04 LED:13 (Ferrier warnings were not required to obtain consent to search purse of person to whom officer had offered a ride from the freeway to a nearby restaurant)

State v. Cole, 122 Wn. App. 319 (Div. II, 2004) Sept. '04 LED:23 (Advance written consent-to-search from a person who was a housemate of a person sentenced to home detention was valid for duration of EHD agreement)

State v. Flowers, 57 Wn. App. 636 (1990) (Consent by person who was under arrest held voluntary on the totality of the circumstances)

State v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609 (Div. III, 2007) Nov. '07 LED:17 (Court of Appeals invalidates written consent given at the jail by a sleep-deprived defendant who was not given Miranda warnings and whose alleged lack of intelligence and education was not rebutted at suppression hearing)

b. Implied consent is possible, but beware

State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746 (2010) March '11 LED:16 (Mere acquiescence to police entry does not constitute consent; officers did not ask for consent to entry)

U.S. v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1989) May '90 LED:09 (Silently turning and walking back into apartment following officer's request to talk is not implied consent for officers to follow; officers did not ask for consent to entry)

c. Scope of consent must be considered

State v. Monaghan, 166 Wn. App. 782 (Div. I, 2012) March '12 LED:09 (General consent to search car and its trunk did not include consent to search a locked container in the trunk)

United States v. Lopez-Cruz, 730 F.3d 803 (9th Cir., Sept. 12, 2013) December '13 LED:02 (Border patrol agent's answering of suspect's cell phone and passing himself off as suspect exceeded scope of suspect's consent to search cell phone; consent to search phone is not consent to answer calls)

d. Undercover entry as consenting entry

State v. Nedergard, 51 Wn. App. 304 (Div. I, 1988) Aug. '88 LED:07 (Holds consent valid but scope of search limited by undercover role)

e. Ruse entry by self-identifying officer as to purpose

Whalen v. McMullen, 907 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir., October 30, 2018) (Officer's ruse as to the purpose of investigation (telling resident she may be a victim of identity theft) precluded consent to entry of social security disability fraud suspect's home, but officer is granted qualified immunity because prior case law was not clear)

2. *Third party consent – Independent dominion & control + Assumed risk*

a. Mutual consent requirement of Leach for business partners, cohabitants

State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735 (1989) Feb. '90 LED:03 (Holds under heightened privacy protection article I, section 7 of Washington constitution that where two business "partners" both were present and had dominion and control over business premises, officers were required to ask both for consent to search)

State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767 (1998) Jan.'99 LED:03 (Exclusionary rule does not apply to consenting cohabitant where Leach rule violated as to cohabitant not asked for consent)

State v. Hoggatt, 108 Wn. App. 257 (Div. II, 2001) Nov. '01 LED:08 (Leach rule does not apply where officers merely request consent to enter living room, as opposed to requesting consent to search)

State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1 (2005) Feb. '06 LED:02 (Leach rule was violated where leaseholder of apartment was in a bedroom because officers obtained consent to search the apartment only from a houseguest who answered their knock on the entry door)

State v. Williams, 148 Wn. App. 678 (Div. II, 2009) April '09 LED:05 (Where uncle was located outside motel room that he was sharing with his adult nephew, the uncle's consent to police to enter room did not support entry to contact the nephew inside without getting nephew's consent too)

b. Exception to Leach rule for MV's (Cantrell)

State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183 (1994) Sept. '94 LED:05 (Leach mutual consent rule applies only to fixed premises and does not apply to motor vehicle searches; warning: if one co-occupant with right to dominion and control of MV objects to search, don't rely on consent of other co-occupant, whether the search is of a MV or of another type of protected area or premises)

c. Select Fourth Amendment cases involving co-occupants or co-users

See also Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006) May '06 LED:05 (Under the Fourth Amendment, which imposes a less restrictive mutual consent rule than does the Washington constitution, if two persons with authority to consent to a search of an area are both present and one consents and the other objects, officers do not have a valid consent to search the area); and see **Fernandez v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (Feb. 25, 2014) April '14 LED:03 (Under Fourth Amendment, after domestic violence suspect was lawfully arrested and removed from his residence, his earlier objection to police entry was not a barrier to police search based on new consent from his co-resident victim; Fernandez possibly overrules U.S. v. Brown, 563 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2009) Aug. '09 LED:06 (Consent by residential co-occupant #1 supported search of residence where (A) co-occupant # 2 had been arrested and taken away from the scene, and (B) such arrest and transport was not a pretext to**

prevent him from objecting to the search; but Washington officers should beware of a pretext challenge under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution)

Girlfriend had authority to consent to search for child porn on computer that imprisoned boyfriend owned, and he had allowed her to use without restriction and without password protection. United States v. Stanley, 653 F.3d 946 (9th Cir., Aug. 2, 2011) February '12 LED:08

d. Family relationships (parent-child)

State v. Summers, 52 Wn. App. 767 (Div. I, 1988) Feb. '89 LED:07 (Parent or guardian generally can consent to search of juvenile's room; but beware of the child who pays rent or is no longer dependent)

e. Real property relationships (landlord-tenant, host-guest, co-tenant)

State v. Birdsong, 66 Wn. App. 534 (Div. I, 1992) Jan. '93 LED:01 (Holds that landlord could not lawfully consent to search of premises not yet abandoned by tenant)

State v. Koepke, 47 Wn. App. 897 (Div. III, 1987) Oct. '87 LED:03 (Host who used guest's room to store items and accessed the room on occasion had authority to consent to search of the guest room)

f. Other relationships (bailor-bailee, employer-employee, school administration)

Generally, a person (bailor) who loans a car to another (bailee) assumes the risk that the borrower will consent to a search of the car. LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 8.6(a).

State v. Vanhollenbeke, 190 Wn.2d 315 (March 15, 2018) (Washington Supreme Court holds under special circumstances of punched-out ignition and driver-with-no-key that consent to search by car's absent owner overrides refusal to consent by on-scene borrower-driver. However, court sets general standard that would in most situations not allow absent owner to override borrower's refusal of consent.)

Employer authority to consent to search of employee desks, file cabinets, and lockers depends on regulations, policies and practices of employer in relation to those areas. LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 8.6(d).

K-12 school authorities may consent to search of a student's locker. LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 8.6(e).

3. *“Apparent authority” of 3rd party not enough to justify consent search under the Washington constitution*

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) Aug. '90 LED:08 (U.S. Supreme Court holds under Fourth Amendment that “apparent authority” of 3rd party allows police to act on that person’s consent to search - - But see next entry re the Washington Supreme Court’s Morse decision, rejecting “apparent authority” doctrine on state constitutional grounds)

State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1 (2005) Feb. '06 LED:02 (In case where leaseholder of apartment was in a bedroom and officers obtained consent to search the apartment only from a houseguest who answered their knock on the apartment entry door, the Washington Supreme Court holds that the Washington constitution, article I, section 7, does not recognize the “apparent authority” doctrine followed under the federal constitution’s Fourth Amendment).

G. Warrantless Search Based On “Exigent Circumstances” Or Under Non-investigative Rationales Of “Community Caretaking Function” Or “Emergency Circumstances”

In Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S.Ct. 1596 (May 17, 2021), the United States Supreme Court held that to the extent that there is a “community caretaking exception” to the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement, that rationale did not allow under the facts of that case for a warrantless, non-consenting entry of a residence to search for and seize firearms of a possibly suicidal resident. This ruling by the Supreme Court does not address the scope of “exigent circumstances” or “emergency circumstances” exceptions to the warrant requirement – the court treats those exceptions, which the government defendants did not rely on in this case, as unrelated to any community caretaking exception. A majority of the Court appears to see the concept of an “emergency search” as a subpart of the “exigent circumstances” exception to the Fourth Amendment. Note also that the U.S. Supreme Court applies a strictly objective test (was the officer reasonable under the factual circumstances) and does not consider subjective intent of officers in determining whether these exceptions apply. On the other hand, the Washington Supreme Court appears to apply a test for these exceptions that considers both (1) objective justification (were officers acting reasonably under the facts) and (2) subjective purity (did the officers act under a pretext).

1. Under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, there must be an articulable basis – for example, the need to protect property or persons under “community caretaking function” and both (1) objective and (2) subjective elements must be met.

Domestic violence calls often present emergency or exigent circumstances. The following are examples:

State v. Lynd, 54 Wn. App. 18 (Div. I, 1989) Nov. '89 LED:07 (Looking for DV victim following hang-up call – man with cut on face admits to hitting spouse, but says that she is no longer home – officers may go in to look for her)

State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459 (Div. I, 1989) Jan. '90 LED:10 (Looking for DV suspect – officer responding to DV report from neighbor, know of history of DV, officer's see man looking out window as they arrive, woman answers door and says “no problem” and no one there but her and son – officers may go in to look for suspect)

State v. Menz, 75 Wn. App. 351 (Div. II, 1994) Feb. '95 LED:17 (Anonymous caller reports sounds of DV; when police arrive, door open on a cold winter night, TV on, and no response to knock and announce – officers may go in to check on status of occupants)

U.S. v. Black, 466 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2006) Dec. '06 LED:13 (For officers responding to a DV 911 call from a victim, exigent circumstances and community caretaking function justified entry of residence to look for the victim, whose present whereabouts were unknown, even though there was some reason to believe that the victim was no longer present in the premises)

State v. J. Weller, State v. S. Weller, 185 Wn. App. 913 (Div. II, Feb. 18, 2015) March '15 LED:02 (In case involving warrantless, non-consenting home entry by six officers to conduct “health and safety check” on alleged victims of parental child beating (making entry at time that the parents and the children were present), State prevails on constitutional search issues regarding community caretaking function (under questionable “health and safety check” analysis) and plain view exceptions to search warrant requirement)

But in State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746 (2011) March '11 LED:16, the Washington Supreme Court held that the circumstances of (1) overheard shouting, (2) somewhat excited or flustered demeanor of the woman opening the door to police, and (3) her initial lie that there was not another person in the premises (the other person appeared to police before they entered) did not add up to emergency DV circumstances that would justify non-consenting entry of the premises.

And in State v. Williams, 148 Wn. App. 678 (Div. II, 2009) April '09 LED:05, where an uncle was located outside the motel room that he was sharing with his adult nephew, and the uncle alleged that the nephew had previously assaulted him shortly before while both were inside, there was no justification for police entry under the community caretaking or emergency aid rationales where the nephew was alone inside and was not himself in any distress or danger.

2. *Other arguable exigencies reviewed on totality of circumstances*

Scientific fact of natural dissipation of alcohol in bloodstream is not per se exigency that justifies non-consenting blood test in criminal cases where driving under the influence is an element of the crime; totality of the circumstances must be considered in order to determine if exigent circumstances exist. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (April 17, 2013) June '13 LED:03.

Exigent circumstances exception to search warrant requirement for blood draw was almost certainly met where drunk driver was unconscious at the hospital, but defendant is given a slim chance on remand of the case to prove that the exception does not apply in his case. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S.Ct. 2525 (June 27, 2019)

Following arrest of car's occupants who were suspected of having committed a drive-by shooting a few minutes earlier, reasonable suspicion that a gun was in the car, plus the officers' non-investigative and non-pretextual public safety concerns about accidental gun discharge during towing, supported the officers' action of looking for a gun in the car and retrieving the gun before the officers impounded the car and had it towed. State v. Duncan, 185 Wn.2d 430 (April 28, 2016) April '16 LED:05

State v. Swenson, 59 Wn. App. 586 (Div. I, 1990) Feb. '91 LED:16 (Mere fact entry door was open on a warm summer night plus lack of response to police doesn't justify entry of home)

State v. Downey, 53 Wn. App. 543 (Div. I, 1989) June '89 LED:12 (Strong ether smell justified entry of apparently unoccupied house) **But see State v. Lawson, 135 Wn. App. 430 (Div. II, 2006) Dec. '06 LED:15 (In light of officers' actions treating the matter as an ordinary criminal investigation, not as an emergency, an anonymous 911 call and the officers' detection of strong chemical odor coming from a shed did not justify entry of the shed under community caretaking or emergency exceptions to search warrant requirement); see also State v. Leffler, 140 Wn. App. 223 (Div. II, 2007) Oct. '07 LED:16; State v. Leffler, 142 Wn. App. 175 (Div. II, 2007) Apr. '08 LED:25 (Similar ruling holding that entry of a fifth wheel trailer was unjustified)**

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (No "death scene" search exception; get a warrant once exigencies cease to exist)

State v. Angelos, 86 Wn. App. 253 (Div. I, 1997) Sept. '97 LED:12 (Mom OD'd on drugs; police search home for drugs to protect children living in the house)

State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511 (2009) March '09 LED:10 (Officers at residence investigating theft of tanker truck carrying anhydrous ammonia were justified (based on objective test and the absence of evidence of pretext) in warrantless residence search for (1) gun (that they believed had been moved after they arrived) and (2) possible third methamphetamine manufacturing suspect.)

State v. Hos, 154 Wn. App. 238 (Div. II, 2010) March '10 LED:16 (Community caretaking function justified officer's warrantless entry of residence to see if the non-responsive, apparently unconscious person observed in open view on a couch was in need of medical help)

State v. Gibson, 152 Wn. App. 945 (Div. II, 2009) Jan. '10 LED:11 (Open view of methamphetamine manufacturing materials in car during traffic stop provided exigent or emergency circumstances supporting entry of the car to make sure the materials were secure before the car was transported to an impound lot while a search warrant was sought)

H. Searches By Private Citizens

Private citizens are not subject to restriction or exclusion of evidence unless an officer or other government representative does something to make the citizen an “agent” of law enforcement. State v. Walter, 66 Wn. App. 862 (Div. I, 1992) Feb. '93 LED:12. Note, however, that the Fourth Amendment “private search doctrine” that allows law enforcement to follow up the private search by going without a warrant wherever the citizen has gone does not apply under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution. State v. Eisfeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628 (2008) July 08 LED:09

I. Searches By School Authorities

There is a special rule for searches by school authorities not acting as agents of police: individualized reasonable belief standard – see RCW 28A.600.210-240. See, for example, State v. Brooks, 43 Wn. App. 560 (Div. I, 1986) Aug. '86 LED:11 (Search of student's locker by school administrator lawful based on reasonable suspicion that the locker contained illegal drugs); **State v. Brown and State v. Duke, 158 Wn. App. 49 (Div. III, 2010) Dec. '10 LED:18 (High school administrators' search of student's vehicle in school parking lot (with police standing by) upheld as reasonable under school search exception to search warrant requirement; Court of Appeals notes that article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution does not impose a more restrictive rule on school authorities than does the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. constitution); State v. Meneese, 174 Wn.2d 937 (August 2, 2012) Oct. '12 LED:10 (Search by police officer acting as resource officer at high school held under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution as not qualified as a school search); State v. A.S., 6 Wn. App. 2d 264 (Div. I, December 3, 2018) (In a debatable ruling, appeals panel rules that vice principal's warrantless, non-consenting, non-exigent search on middle school grounds of a 14-year-old suspected trespasser's backpack was not justified by mere odor of marijuana where, purported, no other facts supported the intrusion by vice principal.) (Review denied by Washington Supreme Court)**

J. Probationer, Parolee Searches – Police Assistance To CCO

Note 2016 Washington legislation, SB 6459 (Chapter 234) Enacts RCW 9.94A.718, which provides that: (1) any peace officer, whether a general or limited authority officer, has authority to assist DOC with supervision regarding post-conviction violations of sentence; (2) “If a peace officer has reasonable cause to believe an offender is in violation of the terms of supervision, the peace officer may conduct a search as provided in RCW 9.94A.631, of the offender's person, automobile or other personal property to search for evidence of the violation;” (4) officers may

assist DOC with search of residence if requested by DOC; (5) nothing prevents officers from arresting offender for new crime as a result of search; and (6) officers should notify DOC of violations.

State v. Reichert, 158 Wn. App. 374 (Div. II, 2010) Feb. '11 LED:07 (Court of Appeals holds: (1) that law enforcement officers did not pretextually make a community corrections officer their "stalking horse" when the officers supported the CCO in a warrantless arrest of a suspected probation violator from a residence; but (2) that, per State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620 (2009) Feb. '10 LED:24, the case must be remanded for a trial court determination of whether the CCO and officers had probable cause, not mere reasonable suspicion, that the probationer resided in the premises from which he was arrested without a warrant (note that Winterstein left open the issue of whether there must also be probable cause that the probationer is home at the time of the entry).

U.S. v. Mayer, 530 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2008) Oct. '08 LED:15; Cuevas v. De Roco, 531 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2008) Oct. '08 LED:15 (In light of interests of other residents, entry of a residence to seize a probationer or parolee for a suspected violation requires probable cause to believe that the probationer or parolee resides at the residence)

State v. Jardinez, 184 Wn. App. 518 (Div. II, November 18, 2014) January '15 LED:03 (RCW 9.94A.631 violated where CCO searched parolee's electronic device without reasonable suspicion that device contained evidence of criminal conduct or of violation of other conditions of community custody)

United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir., March 3, 2016) Fourth Amendment limits search of probationer's cell phone despite broad authorizing language of California statute and of the search conditions of probation.

K. Impound-Inventory Of Motor Vehicles And Of Containers

Washington constitution is more restrictive than federal constitution

State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761 (1998) Sept. '98 LED:08 (Inventory scope cannot extend to locked trunk absent a "manifest necessity" even if there is a trunk release button in passenger area of vehicle)

State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592 (Div. I, 2001) March '02 LED:02 (Inventory search authority does not permit inspection of contents of closed containers absent "manifest necessity" to do so); State v. Wisdom, 187 Wn. App. 652 (Div. III, May 19, 2015) (same as Dugas)

All Around Underground, Inc. v. WSP, 148 Wn.2d 145 (2002) Feb. '03 LED:02 (As a matter of statutory interpretation, impound ordinances or WAC rules adopted under authority of RCW 46.55.113 provisions relating to vehicles that are driven by suspended or revoked drivers must allow officers to consider reasonable alternatives to impoundment).

See also Potter v. WSP, 161 Wn.2d 335 (2007) Feb. '08 LED:09; Potter v. WSP, 165 Wn.2d 67 (2008) Jan. '09 LED:03 (WSP may be sued civilly on theory of "conversion" for applying its mandatory impound policy)

State v. Tyler, 177 Wn.2d 690 (May 30, 2013) Aug '13 LED:08 (Impoundment of car that stopped on narrow shoulder in dangerous location and was driven by suspended driver was justified where reasonable alternatives to impoundment were considered; also lawful was inventory of contents of passenger area where operator of vehicle did not own vehicle, so plain view seizure of illegal drugs discovered in passenger area was lawful; Washington Supreme Court also holds that there is no requirement under the inventory exception of the Washington constitution for officers to request consent to conducting an inventory.)

U.S. v. Cervantes, (9th Cir. May 16, 2012) Aug. '12 LED:06 (Impound-inventory held to violate 4th amendment on grounds that (1) community caretaking rationale for impound of the safely parked vehicle was not met, and (2) inventory was pretextual; also, court indicates an arrest cannot support impound-inventory if impound-inventory precedes the arrest). The Ninth Circuit subsequently issued an amended opinion in United States v. Cervantes, deleting its ruling and analysis on pretext, but continuing to rule against the vehicle impound based on (1) failure of the circumstances of the impound of the safely parked vehicle to satisfy the community caretaking rationale for impounds, and (2) the occurrence of the impound-inventory prior to the arrest of the vehicle operator. U.S. v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir., Nov. 28, 2012) February '13 LED:07

State v. Dunham, 194 Wn. App. 744 (Div. II, June 28, 2016) (Court of Appeals upholds inventory search of locked pocket of impounded backpack per agency policy because of officer's reasonable concern that the pocket contained knife that posed danger to jail staff; inventory is held justified under Washington constitution based on "manifest necessity.")

State v. Froehlich, 197 Wn. App. 831 (Div. II, February 14, 2017) (Court of Appeals panel holds that impound of car was not lawful under both constitutional and statutory analysis because the State failed to prove that officer considered reasonable alternative to impoundment by asking operator of wrecked car whether she wanted to arrange for towing of car)

State v. Villela, 194 Wn.2d 451 (October 17, 2019) (Washington Supreme Court rules that under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution RCW 46.55.360, which mandates impounding of vehicle in DUI arrests violates the constitution because the statute does not require that officers consider reasonable alternatives to impoundment)

State v. Peck, State v. Tellvik, ___ Wn.2d ___, 449 P.3d 235 (September 26, 2019) (Independent grounds interpretation of the Washington constitution regarding standing: Defendants held to have automatic standing to challenge the scope of a

warrantless inventory search of a stolen vehicle, but the scope of the search is held in a 5-4 ruling to have been properly extended to opening an innocuous, unlocked container (which was not luggage, purse, or shaving kit or similar item with “aura of privacy”) of unknown ownership found in the passenger area of a stolen vehicle that was associated with the defendants, who were apprehended just after burglarizing a home.

L. Securing Room Or House On PC While Warrant Is Sought

Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) April '01 LED:02 (Officers who develop probable cause to search residence while there for an unrelated purpose may secure the premises from the outside and expeditiously seek a search warrant) (U.S. Supreme Court)

State v. Solberg, 66 Wn. App. 66 (1992) Nov. '92 LED:10 (House may be secured from the outside on probable cause while warrant is sought, but search must await warrant; note that the Washington Supreme Court issued a further decision, State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688 (1993), but did not address the issue relating to the securing of the house while a search warrant was sought)

U.S. v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2010) July '10 LED:15 (seizure of residence for over 26 hours before making application for search warrant held to violate Fourth Amendment of U.S. constitution)

M. Securing Personal Property On Reasonable Suspicion Or PC

Officers with reasonable suspicion to search vehicles or other personal property may take such items from persons in possession and secure such items briefly (under time limits similar to those under Terry v. Ohio) to diligently investigate. Officers with probable cause to search such items may take such items from persons in possession and secure the items for a longer period, but still only for a period that is objectively reasonable in duration, while the officers expeditiously seek a search warrant. See LaFave, Search and Seizure, 3rd Ed., Sec. 9.8(e); see also State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641 (Div. II, 1992) Apr. '98 LED:09 (Vehicle may be seized based on probable cause to search and towed to a secure location while officers are expeditiously seeking a search warrant)

N. No Carroll Doctrine (No PC Exception For Cars) In Washington

State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686 (1983) Feb. '84 LED:01 (Mobility of MV alone is not “exigent circumstance” justifying a warrantless search based on probable cause to search alone); **State v. Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d 364 (2010) Sept. '10 LED:09 (same ruling)**

O. No “Forfeitable Property” Exception To Warrant Requirement

State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61 (1996) July '96 LED:11 (Mere fact that MV lawfully seized for forfeiture under drug laws does not authorize full search without a warrant)

III. INTERROGATIONS LAW, A FEW SELECT CASES

Note: This outline focuses on appellate decisions, but readers should be aware of the requirements of two enactments from the 2021 Washington Legislature generally impacting law enforcement interrogations of suspects. Appellate court decisions regarding the 2021 legislation no doubt will be coming several years from now.

- Chapter 328, Washington Laws of 2021 (effective date: January 1, 2022) generally requires, with only a few limited exceptions, that juveniles be provided access to an attorney prior to any custodial interrogation, as well in certain other specified circumstances.
- Chapter 329, Washington Laws of 2021 (effective date: January 1, 2022) requires, with several significant exceptions, the recording of custodial interrogations by Washington law enforcement officers (A) of juveniles regarding suspected misdemeanors or felonies, and (B) of adults regarding suspected felonies.

A. Miranda warnings requirement (custody plus interrogation)

The requirement is triggered by (1) custody which is the functional equivalent of arrest (not by mere focus or PC to arrest) plus (2) interrogation.

Stansbury v. Calif., 511 U.S. 318 (1994) July '94 LED:02; See also State v. D.R., 84 Wn. App. 832 (Div. I, 1997) May '97 LED:10 (Warnings were required prior to officer's questioning of 14-year-old who had been called to the principal's office at school for accusatory questioning about suspicion of incestuous sex acts); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (June 16, 2011) August '11 LED:03 (Where an officer knows or reasonably should know that the suspect being questioned is a juvenile, the suspect's age is an objective factor that must be considered – the question is how a typical juvenile of that age would perceive the detention); State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210 (2004) Sept. '04 LED:12 (questioning by Spokane City Parks security guards was not "custodial"); State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22 (2004) Sept. '04 LED:10 (questioning of suspect on her porch after she was told she did not have to answer questions and was free to leave was not "custodial" and the fact that the officers had PC to arrest her and had focused on her as a suspect was irrelevant); Beware of outlier analysis by Court of Appeals in State v. France, 129 Wn. App. 907 (Div. II, 2005) Dec. '05 LED:17 (Where officer told Terry DV detainee that the officer would let him go once matters were "cleared up," the suspect was in the functional equivalent of custodial arrest); Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181 (2012) June '12 LED:09 (Considering all the circumstances, including fact that suspect Fields was told at start and later that he was free to leave at any time and return to his jail cell, Fields was not in custody for Miranda purposes – and therefore Miranda warnings and waiver were not required – where officers had him removed from his cell and questioned him about uncharged offenses allegedly committed prior to his incarceration.)

B. “Initiation Of Contact” Rule Of Fifth Amendment

The initiation of contact rule generally bars police initiation of contact with subject of custodial interrogation request who asserts right to silence or requests an attorney and then remains in continuous custody.

Fifth Amendment “Initiation” article is available on CJTC [LED](#) WEBPAGE. Recently added cases include:

Sixth Amendment initiation-of-contact rule of Michigan v. Jackson is eliminated in a 5-4 decision. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009) July '09 [LED](#):15

Fifth Amendment initiation-of-contact rule clarified: (1) bright-line, 14-day-break-in-custody rule created to set boundary for police-initiated, subsequent attempt at custodial interrogation after attorney-right asserted by custodial suspect; (2) the new 14-day standard includes convicted and sentenced prisoners immediately returned to general prison or jail population after asserting right to attorney during custodial interrogation. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213 (2010) April '10 [LED](#):03

Where custodial defendant understood lawful Miranda warnings, his silence at the outset of questioning and throughout much of nearly-three-hour interrogation session did not make inadmissible his confession that came near the end of the session; his waiver was implied in his confession and at no point had he invoked his Miranda rights. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010) July '10 [LED](#):02

Officer’s initiation of contact with continuous-custody suspect who had asserted right to silence two hours earlier upheld under Michigan v. Mosley/Miranda initiation-of-contact rule; officer’s initiation of contact related to a different crime than was the subject of the earlier contact, and he re-Mirandized the suspect before questioning him as to the other crime. State v. Brown, State v. Duke, 158 Wn. App. 49 (Div. III, 2010) December 10 [LED](#):18

Mirandized suspect held to have made an “unequivocal” request for an attorney during custodial interrogation such that questioning should have stopped; State’s context-based argument is rejected. State v. Nysta, 168 Wn. App. 30 (Div. I, May 7, 2012) July '12 [LED](#):09

Suspect’s attempt to anticipatorily invoke Miranda rights during non-custodial questioning will not bar later police contact to obtain waiver for questioning. Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 236 (2011) August '12 [LED](#):05.

Suspect’s statement during interrogation that “I don’t want to talk right now, man” must be viewed in context of what was said and done before that, and was merely his way of saying he was choosing to make a police-aided written

statement over making a tape-recorded statement. State v. Piatnitsky, 180 Wn.2d 407 (2014) July '14 LED:12

Suspect's statement that "I don't want to talk about it" immediately after receiving Miranda warnings was not ambiguous in the context of this case, and officer's remark a few minutes later that "Sometimes we do things we normally wouldn't do, and we feel bad about it later" was unlawful re-interrogation. In re Personal Restraint of Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664 (June 26, 2014) Aug. '14 LED:12

(1) Assertion of silence right not violated in contact by different officers 5 hours later, and (2) later assertion of counsel right not violated because suspect initiated the next contact with an officer. State v. Elkins, 188 Wn. App. 386 (Div. II, June 15, 2015) July '15 LED:07

C. CrR 3.1 And CrRLJ 3.1 Require That After Making An Arrest Police Advise An Arrestee Of The Right To Counsel Under The Court Rules

State v. Trevino, 127 Wn.2d 735 (1995) Jan. '96 LED:03 (Officer should have advised DUI arrestee of CrR 3.1 right to counsel at time of arrest, but there was no prejudice in the violation, so BAC test not suppressed)

State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193 (2002) Feb. '03 LED:03 (Warnings of right to contact attorney prior to BAC testing must advise of right "at this time," so that DUI arrestee is informed of right to consult an attorney before arrestee decides whether to take BAC test – however, error did not create prejudice under the facts, so suppression is not required)

State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244 (1996) Jan. '97 LED:03 (Officer should have advised murder suspect of CrR 3.1 counsel right before forcibly transporting him to jail facility, but there was no prejudice in the violation)

D. CrR 3.1 And CrRLJ 3.1 Further Require That Reasonable Effort Be Made To Accommodate Request For Phone Consult With Counsel

State v. Kirkpatrick, 89 Wn. App. 407 (Div. II, 1997) March '98 LED:12 (Where arrestee stopped interrogation with request for attorney during custodial interrogation, out-of-town detective should have tried to place defendant in phone contact with counsel immediately, rather than simply stopping questioning and transporting; but error held harmless)

State v. Greer, 62 Wn. App. 779 (Div. I, 1991) Feb. '92 LED:05 (Request for attorney during post-arrest, pre-appearance screening at jail by public defender's office may trigger right to counsel under Washington Court Rules)

Arrestee who had initially invoked his right to an attorney under Criminal Rule 3.1 held to have waived that right where he initiated a conversation with officers and made volunteered statements. State v. Mullins, 158 Wn. App. 360 (Div. II, November 1, 2010) January '11 LED:20

Double-murder defendant wins argument that 1) he unequivocally asserted his right under Criminal Rule 3.1 to attorney contact, and 2) he was not given reasonable assistance to make such contact. State v. Pierce, 169 Wn. App. 533 (Div. II, July 17, 2012) October '12 LED:13

IV. CONSULAR CONTACT WARNINGS TO ARRESTED FOREIGN NATIONALS

A website of the United States Department of State with comprehensive information on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (including consular notification and access) can be accessed at <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/consularnotification.html> . On the CJTC Internet LED page is a link to a comprehensive guide on a number of legal subjects of interest to law enforcement officers; "Confessions, Search, Seizure and Arrest: Guide for Police Officers and Prosecutors May 2015" by Pamela B. Loginsky, Staff Attorney, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys; Ms. Loginsky's "Guide" contains extensive information of interest to law enforcement regarding the rights of arrested foreign nationals under the Vienna Convention (pages 41-51).

V. INTERCEPTING AND RECORDING PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS

A. Unlawful Arrest Of Citizen Who Tape Records Officer On Street

RCW 9.73, the "Privacy Act" governing the interception and recording of private conversations and communications, does not define "private conversation" for purposes of the Act's general prohibition on single-party-consent taping of private conversations. However, several decisions have held that a citizen does not violate the statute if the citizen tapes the officer's spoken words or radio communications where the contact occurs in a public place. State v. Flora, 68 Wn. App. 802 (Div. I, 1992) July '93 LED:17; Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2003) Sept. '03 LED:06 (Civil rights lawsuit for unlawful arrest); Johnson v. City of Sequim, 382 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2004) Oct. '04 LED:22; Dec. '04 LED:14 (Civil rights lawsuit for unlawful arrest).

B. Officer Tape-recording Street Contact

Lewis v. DOL, 157 Wn.2d 446 (2006) Sept. '06 LED:09 (Patrol car audio and video recording of traffic stops must comply with oral warning requirement of RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) even though the street conversations are not "private;" but only the recordings, not the officers' recollections of the events, are to be excluded from evidence for the chapter 9.73 violation)

C. One Civilian Secretly Taping Another In 2-Person Private Talk

State v. Kipp, 179 Wn.2d 718 (February 6, 2014) April '14 LED:14 (Privacy Act violated by man's secret audio recording of one-on-one kitchen conversation with brother-in-law in circumstance where the man suspected the brother-in-law of molesting the man's underage daughters; conversation held to be "private" as a matter of law.)

D. Using Speakerphone Or Extension Phone To Eavesdrop

State v. Christensen, 153 Wn.2d 186 (2004) Feb. '05 LED:09 (The Washington Supreme Court holds that it violates RCW 9.73 to secretly use a speakerphone function, without court authorization, to eavesdrop on a private phone conversation; the Court distinguishes the “tipped phone” case of State v. Corliss, 123 Wn.2d 656 (1994) June '94 LED:02, where the Court found no violation of chapter 9.73 RCW when an officer, without court authorization, listened in on a phone conversation by having a consenting participant tip the phone receiver so that the officer could hear the conversation too.)

E. Taping Outgoing Inmate Call From City Or County Jail

State v. Modica, 164 Wn.2d 83 (2008) Sept. '08 LED:13 (Where King County Jail phones for outgoing inmate calls provided clear notice that all such calls are recorded, the Jail's recording of inmate calls was held to be both “not private” and “consenting” under chapter 9.73 RCW)

F. Miscellaneous Other Rulings Re Chapter 9.73 RCW

State v. Smith, 189 Wn.2d 655 (November 22, 2017) (Washington Supreme Court is unanimous on result but split on rationale in ruling that voicemail recording is admissible where defendant triggered recording on his own cell phone when he called the phone while he was searching for the phone and threatening his wife. Majority of Justices conclude that what was taped was not a “conversation” (though it was “private”). They also hold in the alternative that, even if the words and sounds that were taped were part of a “conversation,” the recording is admissible based on (1) an inference of defendant’s consent to the recording, and (2) the threat exception for single party consent recordings.)

Because of the nature of the communications method, a person who sends an email message or a text message impliedly consents to the recording of the message for purposes of chapter 9.73 RCW. State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666 (2002); State v. Racus, 7 Wn. App. 2d 287 (2019).

Washington case law supports answering phone calls that come in during execution of a search warrant at a drug dealer’s residence (though it is good idea to justify and seek such authority in a search warrant application). State v. Goucher, 124 Wn.2d 778 (1994) Dec. '94 LED:14 (HELD: no constitutional violation of caller’s rights occurred where detective answered phone during search warrant execution); State v. Gonzales, 78 Wn. App. 976 (Div. I, 1995) Jan. '96 LED:22 (HELD: answering phone during search warrant execution did not violate chapter 9.73 RCW because use of the phone was not use of a “device” nor was it an “interception” within the meaning of the statute; and such answering of phone call did not violate the constitution either case involved using the phone call information against the resident whose phone was answered).

See also State v. Wojtyna, 70 Wn. App. 689 (Div. I, 1993) Dec. '93 LED:20 (HELD: monitoring numbers coming to lawfully seized pager taken from a drug dealer incident to arrest did not violate the statutory or constitutional rights of the sender of the communications); State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 893 (Feb. 27, 2014) May '14 LED:13 and State v. Roden, 179 Wn.2d 862 (Feb. 27, 2014) May '14 LED:08 (HELD: Warrantless monitoring of iPhone previously seized from suspected drug dealer and setting up sting drug deals with senders of messages to iPhone violated the statutory rights (Roden) and constitutional rights (Hinton) of the senders of the messages). No Washington appellate court decision has yet addressed the interests of the owner of a seized device in relation to warrantless monitoring of communications coming in to such a seized device, but these rulings indicate that the Washington Supreme Court would find statutory and constitutional protection against such law enforcement actions).

In a limited, fact-specific ruling, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Washington constitution, article I, section 7, was not violated where an officer performed a ruse by communicating through text messages between an undercover phone and the phone of a suspected drug dealer, and the officer (1) claimed to be a named recent customer of the suspect who had texted with the suspect, (2) claimed that he was using a replacement phone to text the new message, and (3) made a deal to buy methamphetamine. State v. Bowman, ___ Wn.2d ___, 498 P.3d 478 (November 10, 2021).

Note also that in a tape-recorded interrogation of an arrestee, Miranda warnings must be on the tape even if the officer Mirandized the arrestee off the tape shortly before turning on the recorder. State v. Mazzante, 86 Wn. App. 425 (Div. II, 1997) Aug. '97 LED:20; State v. Courtney, 137 Wn. App. 376 (Div. III, 2007) May '07 LED:08

VI. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Article: Inadvertent law enforcement agency recording of attorney telephone calls in violation of attorney-client privilege. February '13 LED:02

Detective's conduct in listening to tapes of several telephone conversations between a defendant and his attorney was "unconscionable" and gave rise to a presumption of prejudice that can be overcome by State only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt; case is remanded for hearing for State to try to meet that standard. State v. Pena Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d 808 (Feb. 6, 2014) April '14 LED:20

Dismissal of charges held to be required based on detective's seizure and scrutiny of attorney-client-protected papers not covered by the search warrant; papers were taken during execution of a search warrant in a child sex abuse investigation and were studied and shared with the prosecutor. State v. Perrow, 156 Wn. App. 322 (Div. III, 2010) July '10 LED:24

VII. LAW ENFORCEMENT CIVIL LIABILITY IS POSSIBLE FOR NOT SHARING EXCULPATORY INFORMATION WITH PROSECUTOR

Under the due process ruling in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), law enforcement agencies are part of the prosecution team, and the team, through the prosecutor, must share exculpatory information with a criminal defendant. After criminal charges have been filed against a defendant, if key witnesses recant or change their stories in a material way, or if the investigating officers learn of other material exculpatory evidence, the officers should immediately share this information with the prosecutor's office. If the officers do not timely share this information with the prosecutor's office, and if the defendant is later acquitted or charges are dismissed or the conviction is vacated, the defendant may be able to later successfully pursue either (1) a federal Civil Rights Act lawsuit, or (2) a common law action under State law for malicious prosecution.

Civil Rights Act Due Process Violation Based On Maryland v. Brady: Tennison v. City and County of San Francisco, 548 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 2008) Feb. '09 LED:05

Malicious Prosecution Civil Lawsuit: Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wn.2d 582 (1983); Peterson v. Littlejohn, 56 Wn. App. 1 (Div. I, 1989)

Of course, Brady violations may also result in overturning of criminal convictions. U.S. v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 10050 (9th Cir. 2007) Oct. '07 LED:05; U.S. v. Price, 566 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009) Aug. '09 LED:13

VII. INDEPENDENT GROUNDS RULINGS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION

GENERALLY CHRONOLOGICAL (BY DATE OF FIRST DECISION IN THE PARTICULAR SUBTOPIC) LIST OF MAJOR RESTRICTIVE INDEPENDENT GROUNDS RULINGS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION, ADDRESSING SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND ARRESTS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

- 1. NO "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOR OFFICERS ENFORCING CLEARLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES**
State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92 (1982) April '82 LED:02
- 2. NO CARROLL DOCTRINE (NO PC CAR SEARCH EXCEPTION)**
State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686 (1983) Feb. '84 LED:01
State v. Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d 364 (2010) Sept '10 LED:09
- 3. LIMITED AUTHORITY TO ACCOMPANY ARRESTEE INTO HIS OR HER PREMISES WITHOUT CONSENT**
State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814 (1984) April '84 LED:01

4. **AGUILAR-SPINELLI TWO-PRONGED TEST FOR INFORMANT-BASED PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRES THAT BOTH PRONGS BE FULLY SATISFIED**
State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432 (1984) Nov. '84 LED:06
State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449 (1984) Nov. '84 LED:11
5. **"OPEN FIELDS" MAY BE PROTECTED IF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IS MANIFESTED**
State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506 (1984)
Dec. '84 LED:06 (airplane over-flight ok)
State v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578 (Div. III, 1999)
Jan. 2000 LED:07 (airplane over-flight ok)
State v. Johnson, 75 Wn. App. 692 (Div. II, 1995)
Jan. '95 LED:19 (unlawful entry of fenced, gated, signed farm)
State v. Thorson, 98 Wn. App. 528 (Div. I, 1999)
Feb. 2000 LED:02 (unlawful entry of remote island property)
State v. Littlefair, 129 Wn. App. 330 (Div. II, 2005)
Nov. '05 LED:13 (unlawful night entry of marked rural property)
State v. Jesson, 142 Wn. App. 852 (Div. III, 2008)
March '08 LED:12 (unlawful entry of marked rural property)
6. **REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES TO IMPOUNDMENT OF A VEHICLE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BEFORE IMPOUNDMENT & INVENTORY**
State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733 (1984) Dec. '84 LED:01; State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 300 (1993); State v. Tyler, 177 Wn.2d 690 (2013) Aug. '13 LED:08
7. **TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS (LONG DISTANCE RECORDS) CAN BE OBTAINED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT ONLY BY SEARCH WARRANT OR PER ONE OF THE RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT**
State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 (1986) Aug. '86 LED:04
8. **VEHICLE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST IS LIMITED TO PASSENGER AREA AND UNLOCKED CONTAINERS, REPOSITORIES AND EFFECTS IN THAT AREA (BUT SEE ITEM # 38 BELOW RE: MV SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST)**
State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 (1986) Aug. '86 LED:01. Note that Stroud was overruled and its holding replaced by a more restrictive rule; see entry # 38 below.
9. **WASHINGTON EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES IN PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS**
State v. Lampman, 45 Wn. App. 228 (Div. II, 1986) Feb '87 LED:13
10. **UNPUBLISHED PHONE LISTING INFORMATION MAY BE OBTAINED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT ONLY THROUGH SEARCH WARRANT OR PER EXCEPTION TO WARRANT REQUIREMENT**
State v. Butterworth, 48 Wn. App. 152 (1987) Aug. '87 LED:19
11. **SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS ARE NOT ALLOWED, AT LEAST IN THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS STATUTORY AUTHORITY**
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454 (1988) July '88 LED:14
12. **CONSENT WHERE COHABITANT IS PRESENT ANYWHERE ON THE PREMISES REQUIRES CONSENT FROM SUCH COHABITANT**
State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735 (1989) Feb. '90 LED:03

State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1 (2005) Feb. '06 LED:02

But see State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183 (1994) Sept. '94 LED:05 (Leach rule not applicable to MV consent searches)

Compare State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767 (1998) Jan. '99 LED:03 (Leach rule doesn't require exclusion of evidence as to consenting co-habitant)

Also compare State v. Hoggatt, 108 Wn. App. 257 (Div. II, 2001) Nov. '01 LED:08 (Leach rule does not apply to mere request to *enter living room* through the front door)

13. GARBAGE CAN FOR A SINGLE RESIDENCE LEFT AT CURBSIDE FOR PICKUP MAY NOT BE SEARCHED BY POLICE WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT OR PER EXCEPTION TO WARRANT REQUIREMENT

State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571 (1990) Jan. '91 LED:02

State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409 (Div. III) 1992) Oct. '92 LED:06 (Boland rule not applicable to communal apartment complex dumpster)

State v. Sweeney, 125 Wn. App. 881 (Div. III, 2005) April '05 LED:15 (Boland rule applies to staged pickup of garbage that made garbage pickup person agent of police)

14. NO "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOR OFFICERS EXECUTING A SEARCH WARRANT INCORRECTLY BELIEVING THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHES PROBABLE CAUSE

State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29 (Div. III, 1991) Nov. '91 LED:09

15. INFRARED THERMAL DETECTION DEVICES MAY NOT BE USED FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT

State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173 (1994) April '94 LED:02 (Note that this is now also the 4th Amendment rule per U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001))

16. WASHINGTON EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPARENTLY GIVES "AUTOMATIC STANDING" TO CHALLENGE UNLAWFUL SEARCH WHERE POSSESSION IS AN ELEMENT OF CRIME CHARGED

State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836 (1995) Jan. '96 LED:07

State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328 (2002) July '02 LED:11

State v. Kypreos, 115 Wn. App. 207 (Div. I, 2002) June '03 LED:16 (in possessing stolen firearm case, defendant had automatic standing to challenge search of stolen fifth wheel trailer)

State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402 (2007)

State v. Peck, State v. Tellvik, ___ Wn.2d ___, 449 P.3d 235 (September 26, 2019)

17. INVESTIGATORY SEARCHES OF VEHICLES SEIZED FOR FORFEITURE MAY NOT BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT OR PER AN EXCEPTION TO WARRANT REQUIREMENT

State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61 (1996) July '96 LED:11

18. ORDER TO STOP OR "SHOW OF AUTHORITY" BY OFFICERS MAY BE A "SEIZURE" EVEN IF SUSPECT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE OFFICERS

State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498 (1998) Aug. '98 LED:02

19. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AGENCY HAS STANDARDIZED PROCEDURES, POLICE INVENTORYING A VEHICLE FOLLOWING A LAWFUL IMPOUND MAY

NOT INSPECT THE CONTENTS OF A LOCKED TRUNK IF NO “MANIFEST NECESSITY” TO DO SO; SAME RULE APPLIES TO INSPECTING THE CONTENTS OF CLOSED CONTAINERS

State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143 (1980) April '81 LED:01 (Note that Houser on its face was grounded solely on the Fourth Amendment, but that the Washington Supreme Court declared in its 1998 White decision that Houser had been grounded in an article I, section 7 interpretation)

State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761 (1998) Sept. '98 LED:08

State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592 (Div. I, 2001) March '02 LED:02

20. OFFICERS USING A “KNOCK AND TALK” PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN CONSENT TO SEARCH A RESIDENCE MUST ADVISE OF THE THREE “R” RIGHTS – RIGHT TO REFUSE, RIGHT TO RESTRICT SCOPE, AND RIGHT TO RETRACT CONSENT

State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103 (1998) Oct. '98 LED:02 (knock-and-talk regarding marijuana grow); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn. App. 972 (Div. II, 2001) Nov. '01 LED:06 (Full Ferrier warnings were required for officers to obtain valid consent to enter a motel room to search for drugs).

But see decisions where Ferrier warnings were not required: State v. Ruem, 179 Wn.2d 195 (Nov. 27, 2013) – January '14 LED:15 (Ferrier warnings will help on voluntariness question but are not necessarily required in order to obtain voluntary consent from a resident to search that person's residence for a third party non-resident where that third party non-resident is wanted on an arrest warrant; note that voluntariness is assessed on the totality of the circumstances, and that factors in the totality analysis include whether warnings were given and how any warnings were worded); State v. Bustamonte-Davila, 138 Wn.2d 964 (1999) Nov. '99 LED:02 (assisting INS arrest at residence); State v. Leupp, 96 Wn. App. 324 (Div. II, 1999) Oct. '99 LED:05 (consenting entry to look for possible DV victim); State v. Williams, 141 Wn.2d 17 (2000) Dec. '00 LED:14 (consenting entry of third party's residence to look for subject of arrest warrant); State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d 557 (2003) Aug. '03 LED:06 (consenting entry of third party's residence to talk to suspect in vandalism incident); State v. Tagas, 121 Wn. App. 872 (Div. I, 2004) July '04 LED:13 (requesting consent for purse search prior to giving person a ride from the freeway) State v. Witherrite, 184 Wn. App. 859 (Div. III, Dec. 9, 2014) January '15 LED:02 (Ferrier “knock and talk” warnings are not required to obtain single-party consent to search a vehicle, but it is “best practice” to give such warnings whenever requesting consent)

21. OFFICERS NEED A WARRANT TO USE A DRUG-SNIFFING DOG TO CHECK FOR DRUGS AT A RESIDENCE

State v. Dearman, 92 Wn. App. 630 (Div. I, 1998) Nov. '98 LED:06

22. DRIVERS, BUT NOT PASSENGERS, MAY BE AUTOMATICALLY ORDERED OUT OF, OR BACK INTO, THEIR VEHICLES AT ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOPS

State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208 (1999) March '99 LED:04

(“heightened awareness of danger” is required in order to take control over non-violator passengers)

23. **“BEND OVER AND SPREAD ’EM” STRIP SEARCH NOT PERMITTED AS ON-SCENE “SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST”**
State v. Rulan C., 97 Wn. App. 884 (Div. I, 1999) May ’99 LED:15
24. **PRETEXT STOPS PROHIBITED – PRETEXT MAY BE PROVEN BY EITHER SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE**
State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343 (1999) Sept. ’99 LED:05
State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284 (2012) March ’13 LED:07 (Washington Supreme Court rejects subjective-pretext argument in case where Court determined that officer had “mixed motive” for stop)
25. **RULE FOR VEHICLE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST DOES NOT PERMIT SEARCH OF NONARRESTEE’S PERSONAL EFFECTS UNLESS ARTICULABLE REASON TO DO SO**
State v. Parker, Hunnel, and Hines, 139 Wn.2d 486 (1999) Dec. ’99 LED:13
26. **EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT HAS BOTH SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS**
State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746 (2011) March ’11 LED:16
27. **TERRY SEIZURE ON REASONABLE SUSPICION NOT PERMITTED FOR NON-TRAFFIC CIVIL INFRACTIONS**
Seattle v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166 (2002) June ’02 LED:19
State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889 (2007) December ’07 LED:18
28. **SEARCH WILL NOT BE DEEMED TO BE “INCIDENT TO ARREST” UNLESS AN ACTUAL CUSTODIAL ARREST PRECEDES THE SEARCH**
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564 (2003) April ’03 LED:03
State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43 (Div. III, 2004) March ’04 LED:11
29. **SEARCH WARRANT IS REQUIRED FOR USE OF GPS DEVICE TO TRACK SUSPECT’S VEHICLE**
State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251 (2003) November ’03 LED:02 (Note that in U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) March ’12 LED:07, the U.S. Supreme Court placed some limits under the Fourth Amendment on law enforcement activity related to attaching and tracking GPS devices)
30. **DURING TRAFFIC STOP, MV PASSENGERS NOT THEMSELVES SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING VIOLATION OF LAW SHOULD NOT BE ROUTINELY ASKED FOR ID OR IDENTIFYING INFORMATION**
State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689 (2004) Aug. ’04 LED:07 (Rankin clarifies State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638 (1980) Aug. ’80 LED:01)
In re Brown, 154 Wn.2d 787 (2005) Sept. ’05 LED:17
Compare: State v. Mote, 129 Wn. App. 276 (Div. I, 2005) Nov. ’05 LED:10 (Rankin rule does not apply to asking occupants of lawfully parked cars for ID or identifying information)
31. **“APPARENT AUTHORITY” DOCTRINE FOR CONSENT SEARCH NOT APPLICABLE UNDER WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION**
State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1 (2005) Feb. ’06 LED:02
32. **RANDOM CHECK OF MOTEL REGISTRY IS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL EVEN IF HOST/PROPRIETOR CONSENTS; BUT CHECK BASED ON OBJECTIVE**

INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN MOTEL ROOM IS PERMITTED

State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121 (2007) July '07 LED:18

In re Personal Restraint of Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370 (2011) June 11 LED:21

- 33. MISDEMEANOR ARREST WARRANT JUSTIFIES FORCED ENTRY OF RESIDENCE TO ARREST UNDER PAYTON/STEAGALD RULE, BUT 1) ENTRY MUST BE REASONABLE IN TIME AND MANNER, 2) PRETEXT WILL INVALIDATE ENTRY, AND 3) ARRESTEE MUST BE HOME (WHETHER ELEMENTS 1, 2 AND 3 APPLY UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 TO ENTRY TO ARREST ON A FELONY ARREST WARRANT REMAINS UNDECIDED)**

State v. Hatchie, 166 Wn.2d 398 (2007) Oct. '07 LED:07

- 34. STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED WASHINGTON STATE AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA FOR BANK RECORDS INVALID**

State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236 (2007) Nov. '07 LED:07

- 35. ARREST UNDER RCW 46.61.021(3) NOT JUSTIFIED IF BASIS FOR REQUEST FOR ID WAS NOT AN OFFENSE UNDER TITLE 46 RCW**

State v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880 (2007) Dec. '07 LED:17

- 36. FOURTH AMENDMENT'S "PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE" THAT ALLOWS POLICE TO GO WHERE CITIZEN HAS GONE NOT APPLICABLE UNDER WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION**

State v. Eisfeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628 (2008) July '08 LED:09

- 37. MODERATE ODOR OF MARIJUANA COMING FROM MV WITH MULTIPLE OCCUPANTS DURING TRAFFIC STOP NOT PC TO ARREST PASSENGER (WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT REJECTS FOURTH AMENDMENT PC TO ARREST RULING OF U.S. SUPREME COURT IN MARYLAND V. PRINGLE, 540 U.S., 366 (2003) AS TO MOTOR VEHICLE WITH MULTIPLE OCCUPANTS WHERE CONTRABAND OR EVIDENCE IS IN OPEN OR PLAIN VIEW)**

State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135 (2008) Sept. '08 LED:07

- 38. SEARCH OF MOTOR VEHICLE INCIDENT TO ARREST OF OCCUPANT GENERALLY NOT PERMITTED ONCE THE ARRESTEE IS SECURED**

State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177 (2012) May '12 LED:25

- 39. SOCIAL CONTACT TURNED INTO "SEIZURE" WHEN OFFICER REQUESTED CONSENT TO FRISK**

State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656 (2009) Feb. '10 LED:17

- 40. "INEVITABLE DISCOVERY" EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION**

State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620 (2009) Feb. '10 LED:24

- 41. CASE-LAW-BASED GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES NOT EXIST UNDER WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION**

State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169 (2010) Aug. '10 LED:10

State v. Adams, 169 Wn.2d 487 (2010) Oct. '10 LED:15

- 42. WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF STUDENT BY POLICE OFFICER ACTING AS SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER DID NOT QUALIFY AS A "SCHOOL SEARCH" UNDER STATE CONSTITUTION REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT WOULD HAVE QUALIFIED AS SUCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT**

State v. Meneese, 174 Wn.2d 937 (2012) Oct. '12 LED:10

43. **WARRANTLESS MONITORING OF IPHONE SEIZED FROM SUSPECTED DRUG DEALER AT HIS ARREST AND SETTING UP STING DRUG DEALS WITH SENDERS OF MESSAGES TO IPHONE VIOLATED THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS OF THE SENDERS OF THE MESSAGES**
State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862 (2014) May. '14 LED:08

Note that in State v. Bowman, ___ Wn.2d ___, 498 P.3d 478 (November 10, 2021), in a limited, fact-specific ruling, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a Washington Court of Appeals decision and held that the Washington constitution, article I, section 7, was not violated where an officer performed a ruse by communicating through text messages between an undercover phone and the phone of a suspected drug dealer, and the officer (1) claimed to be a named recent customer of the suspect who had texted with the suspect, (2) claimed that he was using a replacement phone to text the new message, and (3) made a deal to buy methamphetamine.

44. **SEARCH OF A CONTAINER THAT IS ACTUALLY ON THE PERSON OF AN ARRESTEE AT THE POINT OF ARREST IS SUBJECT TO A CONTEMPORANEOUS SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST (THIS APPEARS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENTS), BUT THIS BRIGHT LINE RULE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CONTAINERS THAT ARE ONLY CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED BY THE ARRESTEE (THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENTS DO NOT CREATE SUCH A DISTINCTION, AT LEAST AS TO ITEMS IN THE LUNGE AREA AT THE POINT OF ARREST; NOTE THAT UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CELL PHONES ARE GENERALLY NOT SUBJECT TO SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AUTHORITY THAT APPLIES TO OTHER ITEMS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY)**
State v. Byrd, 178 Wn.2d 611 (2014) May. '13 LED:12
State v. MacDicken, 179 Wn.2d 936 (2014) April '14 LED:10
State v. Brock, 184 Wn.2d 148 (Sept. 3, 2015) Sept. '15 LED:06
45. **OFFICER-SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS DID NOT SUPPORT SEARCH OF SIX-INCH BY-FOUR-INCH BY-ONE-TO-TWO-INCH LIGHTWEIGHT, OPAQUE HARD BOX LAWFULLY TAKEN FROM DETAINEE'S POCKET IN FRISK**
State v. Russell, 180 Wn.2d 860 (July 10, 2014) September '14 LED:07
(Washington Supreme Court decision appears to be more restrictive on law enforcement than Fourth Amendment doctrine, so Russell appears to qualify for this list of "independent grounds rulings" under the Washington constitution, article I, section 7)
46. **HOMELESS PERSON HAD A HOME-LIKE RIGHT TO PRIVACY WHILE HE WAS INSIDE A COMPLETELY ENCLOSED, TENT-LIKE STRUCTURE THAT WAS COMPLETELY COVERED BY AN OPAQUE TARP; THIS RIGHT EXISTED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS UNLAWFULLY LOCATED DURING DAYTIME HOURS ON PUBLIC LAND LOCATED BETWEEN A**

PUBLIC ROAD'S GUARDRAIL AND A CHAIN LINK FENCE ON PRIVATE PROPERTY

State v. Pippin, 200 Wn. App. 826 (Div. II, October 10, 2017) (Washington Court of Appeals decision is final; the privacy interpretation appears to be more restrictive on law enforcement than Fourth Amendment doctrine, so Pippin appears to qualify for this list of “independent grounds rulings” under the Washington constitution, article I, section 7)

47. ARTICLE I, SECTION 7'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES NOT CONTAIN A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION FOR OFFICER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW

State v. Brown, 7 Wn. App. 2d 121 (Div. III, January 17, 2019), reversed on other grounds by the Washington Supreme Court at 454 P.3d 870 (December 26, 2019) (The Supreme Court ruling did not address the Court of Appeals ruling that an officer's good faith, reasonable, but mistaken, interpretation of the law is irrelevant under the Washington Exclusionary Rule)

48. ATTENUATION DOCTRINE LIMITS THE REACH OF THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 EXCLUSIONARY RULE, BUT THE WASHINGTON ATTENUATION DOCTRINE IS NOT AS FORGIVING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ERRORS AS IS THE ATTENUATION DOCTRINE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871 (February 7, 2019) (Washington Supreme Court rules that giving Ferrier warnings in request for consent for a vehicle search did not attenuate the exclusionary consequences of an unsupported Terry seizure a few minutes earlier)

49. WARRANTLESS PINGING OF A CELL PHONE IN ORDER TO LOCATE AND ARREST A MURDER SUSPECT IS A SEARCH THAT REQUIRES A SEARCH WARRANT OR AN EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT, EVEN IF THE PINGING IS DONE ONLY FOR A SINGLE, REAL-TIME LOCATING OF A SUSPECT

State v. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d 577 (November 7, 2019) (Washington Supreme Court rules that exigent circumstances justified the pinging in this case)

50. IN DETERMINING WHETHER A PERSON WHO IS BLACK, INDIGENOUS, OR OTHERWISE A PERSON OF COLOR (BIPOC) HAS BEEN “SEIZED” BY LAW ENFORCEMENT, WASHINGTON COURTS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PERSON'S RACE OR ETHNICITY AS A FACTOR THAT SUPPORTS THE PERSON'S CLAIM THAT HE OR SHE WAS SEIZED

State v. Sum, ___ Wn.2d ___ (June 9, 2022) (Washington Supreme Court rules that defendant Sum was seized)

QUASI-INDEPENDENT GROUNDS RULINGS (Important Washington Supreme Court decisions purporting to interpret Fourth Amendment but may be more restrictive than the Fourth Amendment requires)

1. **FRISKS IN SEARCH WARRANT EXECUTION MUST ALWAYS BE BASED ON INDIVIDUALIZED BASIS FOR BELIEVING PERSON IS ARMED**
State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289 (1982) Feb. '83 LED:05
2. **UNDER PAYTON/STEAGALD RULE LIMITING POLICE ENTRY OF PRIVATE PREMISES TO MAKE WARRANTLESS ARREST, THE FACT THAT A PERSON FOR WHOM POLICE HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST (BUT NO ARREST/SEARCH WARRANT) OPENS THE DOOR WHEN POLICE KNOCK AT THE DOOR DOES NOT JUSTIFY REACHING THROUGH THE OPEN DOORWAY AND MAKING WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE PERSON**
State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426 (1985) April '85 LED:11
3. **OFFICER-AFFIANT'S STATEMENT ABOUT EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING RE HABITS OF DRUG DEALERS WAS NOT SUFFICIENT ALONE TO LINK DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE TO THE MERE FACT THAT DEFENDANT SOLD A LARGE QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA AT AN UNDISCLOSED LOCATION**
State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133 (1999) Aug. '99 LED:1

Note that a 5-4 majority of the Washington Supreme Court rejected a Thein-based Fourth Amendment challenge to probable cause support for search warrant for cell phone records, including cell site location information, in State v. Denham, 197 Wn.2d 759 (July 1, 2021). The Majority Opinion in Denham identified probable cause in the affidavit's (1) description of defendant's use of cell phones shortly before and shortly after a jewelry store burglary, and (2) strong evidence – including post-burglary fencing activity and the wearing of an unusual jewelry item matching a stolen item – that defendant was the burglar.

Note also that King County *Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Gary Ernsdorff* ((206) 477-3733) offered this helpful advice in July of 2021 in the wake of Denham, “[W]hen reviewing applications for warrants for cell phone records, please make sure you include every bit of information you can that connects the phone number to the suspect. Be very clear and precise. Consistent use and possession over time, and/or use and possession close in time to the crime, should be considered a necessity. Simply relying on the fact that a number is associated with the suspect to get CSLI will lead to trouble (although will likely still get approved by many judges). If you have questions on a specific set of facts, feel free to reach out to the King County Prosecutor’s Special Operations Unit.”

4. **UNDER “IMMEDIATELY APPARENT” ELEMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT “OPEN VIEW DOCTRINE” (MORE ACCURATELY REFERRED TO AS “PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE”), AN OFFICER’S PROBABLE CAUSE THAT AN ITEM BEING PUSHED DOWN THE STREET ON A DOLLY WAS STOLEN PROPERTY DID NOT JUSTIFY THE OFFICER IN REMOVING A BLANKET FROM THE ITEM TO CONFIRM THE OFFICER’S SUSPICION; THAT IS**

BECAUSE THE IDENTITY OF THE OBJECT UNDER THE BLANKET WAS AMBIGUOUS.

State v. Elwell, ___ Wn.2d ___, 2022 WL ___ (March 3, 2022)

As noted above in section II.A.1. of this outline, in State v. Elwell, ___ Wn.2d ___, 2022 WL ___ (March 3, 2022), the Washington Supreme Court declared in the lead Elwell Opinion that the Court was applying the Fourth Amendment and not the Washington constitution, article I, section 7. Then the Court incorrectly used the phrase “open view” in a ruling that logically falls under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine of “plain view.” Addressing the plain view doctrine’s “immediately apparent” requirement, the Washington Supreme Court ruled in Elwell that an officer’s probable cause that an item being pushed down the street on a dolly was stolen property did not justify an officer’s removal of a blanket from the item to confirm the officer’s suspicion. The Elwell Court ruled that way because, at the point when the officer removed the blanket, the identity of the object under the blanket was ambiguous. In that circumstance, an officer apparently may lawfully make an un-consenting seizure of the blanketed item based on probable cause, and the officer may can expeditiously apply for a search warrant.

The Fourth Amendment concept of “open view” is not a term used in U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case law discussions. It has been generally used by some courts, including Washington appellate courts, to describe the situation where an officer makes a lawful observation (under the Fourth Amendment) from outside a constitutionally protected area. For instance, assume that during a traffic stop, from outside the stopped car, an officer recognizes looking through a passenger window as unmistakable evidence of a crime an uncovered item lying on the back seat of the car. The observation itself is lawful because the item is in “open view,” but the open view itself does not justify going inside the vehicle to seize the item. A search warrant or an exception to search warrant requirement is required to justify entering the vehicle to seize the item that is in open view.

On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment concept of “plain view” is used to describe the situation where an officer is “lawfully present” in an area. Lawful presence can be based on presence under the authority a search warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement (for instance, under the impound-inventory search warrant exception, an officer is “lawfully present” inside a vehicle in making a lawful inventory of the contents of a lawfully impounded car). Alternatively, lawful presence for purposes of the plain view doctrine can also be based on the different circumstance that the area in question is not constitutionally protected (for instance, an officer is lawfully present, as in the circumstances of the Elwell case, when the officer contacts a person on a public street, which is a place that is not constitutionally protected against the warrantless presence of government actors).

The Elwell Majority Opinion used the term “open view” to address what the U.S. Supreme Court would call a “plain view” situation. The officer was lawfully present on the street in the contact with the suspect. Regardless of whether one uses the phrase “open view” or “plain view,” however, the rule of Elwell must be followed by Washington officers. That rule for Washington officers is that when officers are lawfully situated in an area such as in Elwell, and they come across an item where the evidentiary value of the object is immediately apparent (i.e., probable cause is present), but the identity of the covered object is ambiguous, they may not search the item or remove an opaque covering to determine with certainty what the object is. To conclude that the identity of the covered object is unambiguous, an officer must be able to determine what the object is with certainty without manipulating the object and only using the officer’s senses. In most circumstances, as I noted above, this test cannot be met, so a search warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement is necessary to justify removing the cover.

This two-part “open view” standard of Elwell (i.e., (1) probable cause of evidentiary value plus (2) no ambiguity of the identity of the item) is, in my view, probably not how the U.S. Supreme Court would articulate the rule on this Fourth Amendment “plain view” question, but Washington officers and the State’s litigators in criminal cases do not have a choice as to how to label, articulate or apply the test in light of the Elwell decision.